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DON’T LET GO OF THE ROPE: REDUCING
READMISSIONS BY RECOGNIZING
HOSPITALS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO THEIR
DISCHARGED PATIENTS
THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER* & JOSHUA HINCKLEY PORTER**
In the early years of the twenty-first century, it was widely speculated that
massive, multi-purpose hospitals were becoming the “dinosaurs” of health
care, to be largely replaced by community-based clinics providing specialty
services on an outpatient basis. Hospitals, however, have roared back to life,
in part by reworking their business model.
There has been a wave of consolidations and acquisitions (including
acquisitions of community-based clinics), with deals valued at $7.9 billion in
2011, the most in a decade, and the number of deals increasing another 18%
in 2012. The costs of hospital care are enormous, with 31.5% ($851 billion) of
the total health expenditures in the United States in 2011 devoted to these
services. Hospitals are (1) placing growing emphasis on increasing revenue and
decreasing costs; (2) engaging in pervasive marketing campaigns encouraging
patients to view hospitals as an all-purpose care provider; (3) geographically
targeting the expansion of their services to “capture” well-insured patients, while
placing greater pressure on patients to pay for the services delivered; (4)
increasing their size, wealth, and clout, with two-thirds of hospitals undertaking
renovations or additional construction and smaller hospitals being squeezed out,
and (5) expanding their use of hospital-employed physicians, rather than relying
on community-based physicians with hospital privileges, and exercising greater
control over medical staff.
Hospitals have become so pivotal in the U.S. healthcare system that the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) frequently
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targeted them as a vehicle to enhance patient safety and control escalating health
care costs. One such provision—the Hospital Readmissions Reduction
Program, which goes into effect in fiscal year 2013—will reduce payments
ordinarily made to hospitals if they have an “excess readmission” rate.
It is estimated that adverse events following a hospital discharge impact as
many as 19% of all discharged patients. When hospitals and similar health
care facilities fail to adequately manage the discharge of their patients,
devastating medical emergencies and sizeable healthcare costs can result.
The urgency to better manage these discharges is compounded by the fact that
the average length of hospital stays continues to shorten, potentially
increasing the number of discharged patients who are at considerable risk of
relapse. Also exacerbating the problem is a lack of clarity regarding who, if
anyone, is responsible for these patients following discharge. Confusion over
who bears responsibility for discharge-related preparation and community
outreach, concerns about compensation, a lack of clear institutional policies,
and the absence of legal mandates that patients be properly prepared for and
monitored after discharge all contribute to the potential abandonment of
patients at a crucial juncture.
Although the PPACA establishes financial incentives for hospitals and
similar facilities to combat the long-standing problem of high readmission
rates, it does not provide a remedy for patients who have suffered avoidable
harm after being discharged without adequate preparation or post-discharge
assistance. This omission is particularly problematic as existing legal
remedies, including medical malpractice suits, have provided little recourse
for patients who have suffered injury that could have been prevented through
the implementation of reasonable discharge-related policies.
To protect the many patients who are highly vulnerable to complications
following discharge and to provide them redress when needed services are
not provided, hospitals’ obligations to these patients should be recognized
for what they are: a fiduciary duty to provide adequate discharge
preparation and post-discharge services. The recognition of this duty is
driven by changes in the nature of hospital care that enhance the
perception that hospitals have become a “big business” that should “carry
their own freight.” Properly interpreted, this duty requires facilities to
implement an appropriate discharge plan and provide post-discharge
services for a period of time commensurate with a patient’s continuing
health risks. Notably, this is not the same as a generalized duty to provide
all patients with continuing post-discharge treatment. It is a more limited
obligation to offer necessary clarification and direction to patients upon
discharge, and to institute a reasonable post-discharge monitoring program
for patients with continuing health risks.
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This recognition of hospitals’ responsibilities to discharged patients will
have a number of beneficial effects. First, it will decrease healthcare costs by
reducing the number of patients readmitted with post-discharge
complications that could have been avoided through better communication
and relatively simple, cost-effective follow-up services. Second, it will reduce
confusion in the health care community regarding who is responsible for postdischarge services by affirmatively assigning responsibility to the entities best
positioned to provide them, namely hospitals and similar discharging
facilities. Third, specifically assigning these responsibilities to hospitals will
establish them as a vital component of hospital care, which should help
hospitals obtain reimbursement from third-party payors for providing them.
Fourth, and most importantly, it will improve the well-being of discharged
patients by better preparing them for discharge, increasing the availability of
post-discharge services, and providing a means of recourse should they suffer
readily preventable injury.
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“Although every handoff carries the potential for information loss, the most
worrisome is at hospital discharge. Part of this is because patients are usually
left ‘to their own recognizance,’ which means it’s up to them to obtain and take
their meds, observe any physical precautions, and make follow-up
appointments with their primary care physicians or recommended specialists.
Many patients . . . are incapable of taking these important steps.”1
INTRODUCTION
Health care in this country is rapidly and dramatically evolving.2
The individualistic vision associated with portrayals such as “Dr.
Kildare” and “Marcus Welby, MD” has faded into the mists of
nostalgia, replaced by an industry both eager and expected to
dominate and direct the delivery of health care. At the center of this
maelstrom are the massive, multifaceted hospital complexes of
today.3 Not surprisingly, just as their role, reach, and influence is
expanding, so too is the law that governs them.4
This Article will focus on one set of hospital-related events that has
received considerable attention in recent years:
readmissions
5
following a hospital discharge. Adverse events following a hospital

1. ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH
BEHIND AMERICA’S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES 165 (2004).
2. See Robert Pear, Gains in Health System Seen as Lasting by Some, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2012, at A12 (reporting that health care delivery in this country has been and will
continue to be transformed); see also infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text
(noting the increased national attention to the high level of medical errors and the
changes within the health care system).
3. See infra notes 155–81 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that
make hospitals seem like “big business”).
4. See infra Parts III–IV (analyzing the legal duties placed on hospitals as courts
increasingly recognize a relationship between hospitals and the well-being of their
patients).
5. While this Article argues that hospitals are well-positioned to provide critically
needed post-discharge monitoring to vulnerable patients, and thus should be held
accountable for a failure to do so, it is recognized that a number of post-discharge
models are being explored, including some that do not directly involve the discharging
hospital. See, e.g., Mary Mosquera, Hudson Valley Care Managers Reduce Readmissions,
GOV’T HEALTH IT (May 21, 2012), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/hudson-valleycare-managers-reduce-readmissions (describing a system where nurse care managers
within primary care practices specifically attend to patients who require a lot of services
and who tend to “fall off physicians’ radar,” and reporting that this system has shown “a
pretty significant drop in readmissions”). This Article focuses on hospitals because
(1) their discharge-related actions have an immediate impact on the well-being of
the patient, (2) they have the most current information regarding the patient’s
ongoing health risks, (3) patients naturally expect assistance to be forthcoming from
hospitals, and (4) hospitals are the most logical and capable candidate for taking on
responsibility for these patients. To the extent that another care provider has
assumed responsibility for the patient, the responsibility of the discharging hospital
should cease, although it will still be responsible for providing appropriate discharge
planning and transitional services until responsibility for the patient has shifted. See
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discharge impact approximately 20% of all discharged patients.6
According to data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, the lead federal agency charged with improving the quality,
safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of healthcare, nearly 4.4 million
hospital admissions per year, entailing costs of nearly $30.8 billion,
could be prevented with “timely and effective ambulatory care or
adequate patient self-management.”7 It has also been calculated that
“[a] typical hospital with 200 to 300 beds wastes up to $3.8 million a
year, or 9.6 percent of its total budget, on readmissions of patients
who shouldn’t have had to come back.”8
Concern about these readmission rates is such that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) now publishes thirty-day
readmission measures, updated quarterly, for patients originally
admitted to hospitals across the country for heart failure, acute
myocardial infarction (heart attack), and pneumonia, with hospitals
classified as “better,” “no different from,” or “worse” than the
national average.9 In addition, as part of its effort to control health
infra Part IV (analyzing the development of the hospital-patient fiduciary relationship
and its applicability to hospital discharges).
6. See Alan J. Forster et al., The Incidence and Severity of Adverse Events Affecting
Patients After Discharge from the Hospital, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 161, 164–65
(2003); see also Sunil Kripalani et al., Promoting Effective Transitions of Care at Hospital
Discharge: A Review of Key Issues for Hospitalists, 2 J. HOSP. MED. 314, 314 (2007)
(reporting that about half of adult hospital patients experience a medical error after
discharge and between 19% and 23% suffer a post-discharge adverse event); infra
notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra Part II.
7. H. JOANNA JIANG ET AL., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, NATIONWIDE
FREQUENCY AND COSTS OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALIZATIONS, 2006, STATISTICAL
BRIEF #72, at 1–2 (2009), available at www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb72.jsp.
8. Jeffrey Young, Typical Hospital Wastes Up to $3.8 Million a Year on Readmissions:
Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2012, 11:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/04/09/hospital-cost-waste-premier_n_1413510.html.
9. Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), CMS Fact
Sheet: CMS Expands Information for Consumers About Outcomes of Care in
America’s Hospitals (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.seniorhealthsciences.org
/public/Weekly_Articles/073010/FactSheetHospitalCompare; see also To Avoid a Return
Trip to the Hospital, Take Action Before You Are Discharged, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/to-avoid-a-return-trip-to-thehospital-take-action-before-you-are-discharged/2012/01/25/gIQAjqvw7R_story.html
(discussing Consumer Reports’ determination that 70% of hospitals earned the lowest
or second-lowest rating for total readmissions). But see Arnold M. Epstein et al., The
Relationship Between Hospital Admission Rates and Rehospitalizations, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2287, 2288 (2011) (finding a “weak relationship between publicly reported measures of
discharge planning and readmission rates”); Ashish K. Jha et al., Public Reporting of
Discharge Planning and Rates of Readmissions, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2637, 2642–43
(2009) (finding “large variations in readmission rates . . . underscoring the need
for . . . a program [to reduce readmission rates in U.S. hospitals,] . . . [but also
noting that t]he very modest association that we observed between readmission rates
and discharge planning measures suggests that the use of public reporting as a
strategy to improve performance on these measures is unlikely to yield large
reductions in unnecessary readmissions.”); Andrew M. Ryan et al., Medicare’s Public
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care costs, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act10 (PPACA),
recently upheld by the Supreme Court,11 seeks to reduce preventable
readmissions by reducing Medicare payments to hospitals with
“excess readmissions.”12
Yet in the ongoing, often political struggle over costs and
readmissions, it is important to remember that saving trips to the
hospital is about saving more than just money. Ray Freeland, a fiftyfour year old man with a history of heart problems, may owe his life
to a pilot program designed to monitor patients in their homes after

Reporting Initiative on Hospital Quality Had Modest or No Impact on Mortality from Three
Key Conditions, 31 HEALTH AFF. 585, 585 (2012) (noting that it is unclear if
improvements reduce mortality rates or sway patients when choosing a hospital).
10. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
11. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012)
(upholding key elements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power, although striking down a provision that
required states to expand Medicaid coverage or lose existing federal payments).
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (Supp. V 2011)) (establishing that payments that would
ordinarily be made to a hospital with “excess readmissions” are to be reduced by an
amount equal to the product of the base operating diagnostic-related group (DRG)
payment amount for the discharge and the adjustment factor for the hospital for the
fiscal year). The calculation is based on a hospital’s “excess readmission ratio,”
which is defined in the Act as risk-adjusted actual readmissions divided by riskadjusted expected readmissions, both of which are to be calculated by a method
endorsed by the private nonprofit entity defined in § 1890(a) of the Social Security
Act. Id.; see also Karen E. Joynt & Ashish K. Jha, Characteristics of Hospitals Receiving
Penalties Under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, 309 JAMA 342, 342 (2013)
(describing the characteristics of the hospitals incurring penalties for high readmission
rates); Cheryl Clark, AHA Rejects Proposed Readmission Penalties, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA
(June 25, 2012), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/print/FIN-281613/AHARejects-Proposed-Readmission-Penalties (projecting that 34.5% of the 3393 hospitals
that could be subjected to a penalty will not receive a readmission penalty, but that the
remainder will, with 14.2% (481 hospitals) receiving the maximum 1% penalty). In
fiscal year 2013, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on hospitals if an excessive
number of patients is readmitted is 1% of their total Medicare billings, which will rise
to 2% in 2014 and 3% in 2015. DAVID C. GOODMAN ET AL., AFTER HOSPITALIZATION: A
DARTMOUTH ATLAS REPORT ON POST-ACUTE CARE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 2
(Kristen K. Bronner ed., 2011). But see Devan Kansagara et al., Risk Prediction Models
for Hospital Readmission: A Systematic Review, 306 JAMA 1688, 1688 (2011) (suggesting
that fairly defining a “normal” level of readmissions may be difficult); Douglas
McCarthy et al., Recasting Readmissions by Placing the Hospital Role in Community Context,
309 JAMA 351, 351 (2013) (challenging policy-makers’ narrow focus on readmission
rates); Muthiah Vaduganathan et al., Thirty-Day Readmissions: The Clock Is Ticking, 309
JAMA 345, 345 (2013) (examining the use of a 30-day window for assessing hospital
readmission rates); Clark, supra (reporting objections that the CMS is
inappropriately counting planned and unrelated readmissions following discharges;
that the proposed formula discriminates against hospitals with a higher percentage
of non-white patients; and that the measure for gauging the rates of readmissions is
unreliable for a majority of the hospitals subject to a possible penalty).
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being discharged from a hospital.13 Rather than requiring frequent
and oftentimes inconvenient visits to a doctor’s office following heart
surgery, the program places a wireless scale and blood pressure cuff
in discharged patients’ homes, which communicate data in real time
to nurses monitoring them for signs of cardiac distress.14 When the
monitoring of Freeland’s pulse indicated an irregular heartbeat,15 he
was immediately contacted and directed to see his doctor, who was
able to “shock his heart back into a normal rhythm.”16 The
responsible medical center, Cedars-Sinai, a hospital and research
facility in Los Angeles, concluded that a potentially serious health
threat had been averted and that about $30,000 in health care costs
was saved as a result.17 Innovative programs such as this are designed
to combat adverse events that follow a hospital discharge.18
13. Avery Johnson, The Do-It-Yourself House Call: Insurer-Endorsed Remote-Monitoring
Technology Leads Heart Patients to Take Their Readings at Home, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704700404575391262635170370.html.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Adam Darkins et al., Care Coordination/Home Telehealth: The Systematic
Implementation of Health Informatics, Home Telehealth, and Disease Management to Support
the Care of Veteran Patients with Chronic Conditions, 14 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH 1118,
1118 (2008) (analyzing the success of a CareCoordination/Home Telehealth
program implemented by the Veterans Health Administration); Mark V. Williams, A
Requirement to Reduce Readmissions: Take Care of the Patient, Not Just the Disease, 309
JAMA 394, 394 (2012) (calling for a patient-centered approach to reduce
readmissions); Press Release, AMC Health, Geisinger Health Plan and AMC Health
Find Success with Remote Patient Monitoring: Improves Case Management
Efficiency; Reduces All-Cause 30-Day Readmissions by 44% (Feb. 28, 2012), available
at https://amchealth.com/uploads/PressRelease__GHP_and_AMC_Health_Find_
Success_with_Remote_Patient_Monitoring_FINAL___v02282012.pdf (reporting the
success of a post-hospital discharge telemonitoring program that uses an interactive
voice response protocol); Berg Insight Says 2.2 Million Patients Are Remotely Monitored Today,
BERG INSIGHT (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.berginsight.com/News.aspx?m_m=6&s_m=1
(forecasting that the number of home monitoring systems with integrated cellular
connectivity will reach 4.9 million connections globally by 2016); Dina Overland,
Readmissions Drop When Pharmacists Visit Patients’ Homes, FIERCEHEALTHPAYER (Apr. 16,
2012), http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/readmissions-drop-when-pharmacistsvisit-patients-homes/2012-04-16 (describing a new post-discharge program where
pharmacists make home visits to patients who are at an increased risk of readmission);
Pharmacists, Nurses Team Up in Pittsburgh Care Transition Project, AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N
(May 21, 2012), http://www.pharmacist.com/pharmacists-nurses-team-pittsburghcare-transition-project (describing the “Pittsburgh Project,” a plan to offer more
integrated care in Western Pennsylvania by creating support centers staffed by
pharmacists and nurse care managers); Ken Terry, Geisinger Plan Reduces Readmissions
44% with Telemonitoring, FIERCEHEALTHIT (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthit.com
/story/geisinger-plan-reduces-readmissions-44-telemonitoring/2012-03-02 (reporting on
the success of the Geisinger Health Plan’s telemonitoring of discharged patients). For a
designed effort to facilitate patient participation in and improve the hospital discharge
process, see Discharge Planning, CENTER FOR MEDICARE ADVOC., INC. (CMA),
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/medicare-info/discharge-planning (last visited Feb.
20, 2013).
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Although the frequency of readmissions is alarming, the causes are
hardly a mystery. Characterized as “a railroad whose tracks change
gauge every few miles,”19 the Institute of Medicine has described
America’s healthcare delivery system as
composed of a large set of interacting systems—paramedic,
emergency, ambulatory, inpatient, and home health care; testing
and imaging laboratories; pharmacies; and so forth—that are
connected in loosely coupled but intricate networks of individuals,
teams, procedures, regulations, communications, equipment and
devices. These systems function within such diverse and diffuse
management, accountability, and information structures that the
overall term health system is today a misnomer.20

Given the complexity of today’s healthcare system, it should come
as no surprise that misunderstandings, fragmented lines of
communication, and a bewildering diffusion of responsibility for
patient care can lead to negative outcomes for vulnerable patients
after their discharge from a hospital or similar care facility.21
Further exploration of the rates of adverse post-discharge incidents
and hospital readmissions reveals the seriousness of the problem.
One study found that 19% of 400 patients consecutively discharged
from the general medical service of a hospital suffered an adverse
health-related event within three weeks of discharge, with roughly
61% of these events being preventable or ameliorable.22 “System
problems” were determined to have contributed to all preventable or
ameliorable events, with poor communication between hospital
caregivers and either the patient or the patient’s primary care
physician in the community being the most common contributing
cause.23 Another study of over five million Medicare patients found
that, depending on the initial reason for their hospitalization,
19. WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 1, at 174.
20. COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 78 (2001); see also THE
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1–3 (Einer Elhauge
ed., 2010) (discussing the need for greater integration to produce more unified
decision making within the healthcare system); François de Brantes et al., Building a
Bridge from Fragmentation to Accountability: The Prometheus Payment Model, 361 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1033, 1033–34 (2009) (imparting the positive effects of a payment model that
incentivizes provider collaboration and “efforts to reduce avoidable complications of
care”); Randall D. Cebul et al., Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S.
Healthcare System, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93, 93 (2008) (noting that a fragmented
healthcare system “lead[s] to disrupted relationships, poor information flows, and
misaligned incentives”).
21. See infra Part II (explaining the legal doctrines applicable to discharged
patients who have been wrongfully injured).
22. Forster et al., supra note 6, at 164.
23. Id. at 165 (finding that 59% of the “preventable and ameliorable adverse
events” were attributable to this deficit).
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between about 13% and 21% of discharges were followed by a
A recent meta-analysis
rehospitalization within thirty days.24
determined that nearly one in four discharged hospital patients were
readmitted within thirty days under conditions described as urgent
and avoidable.25 Such studies have led commentators to assert:
The hospital discharge is poorly standardized and is characterized
by discontinuity and fragmentation of care. Lack of coordination
in the handoff from the hospital to community care, growth of
the hospitalist movement that contributes to handoffs, gaps in
social supports, high rates of low health literacy, and poor
delineation of discharge responsibilities among hospital staff
(often those early in training)—all place patients at high risk of
post-discharge adverse events . . . and re-hospitalization. These
problems are compounded by the length of the typical primary
care visit in the United States, which is 18 minutes, and do not
allow adequate time to become familiar with the details and issues
of the recent hospitalization. These visits must be added to
already overbooked schedules at the time of discharge and
frequently occur without access to a discharge summary or to
diagnostic and procedural reports.26

24. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 15.
25. Carl van Walraven et al., A Meta-Analysis of Hospital 30-day Avoidable
Readmission Rates, 17 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 1211, 1213 (2011); see also JULIE
STONE & GEOFFREY J. HOFFMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40972, MEDICARE HOSPITAL
READMISSIONS: ISSUES, POLICY OPTIONS AND PPACA 4 n.7 (2010) (noting that “in 2005
17.6% of hospital admissions resulted in readmissions within 30 days of discharge,
11.3% within 15 days, and 6.2% within 7 days”); Eric A. Coleman et al., The Care
Transitions Intervention: Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1822, 1822 (2006) (“National 30-day readmission rates among older Medicare
beneficiaries range from 15% to 25%.”); Kumar Dharmarajan et al., Diagnoses and
Timing of 30-Day Readmissions After Hospitalization for Heart Failure, Acute Myocardial
Infarction, or Pneumonia, 309 JAMA 355, 355 (2013) (reporting national readmission
rates from 2007 through 2009); Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among
Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1418, 1420–28
(2009) (recording that 19.6% of 11,855,702 hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries were
rehospitalized within thirty days and 34% within ninety days at a cost of $17.4 billion,
with 90% of the readmissions potentially preventable); Sunil Kripalani et al., Effect of
a Pharmacist Intervention on Clinically Important Medication Errors After Hospital
Discharge, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1, 1, 2, 5 (2012) (stating that 11% to 17% of
patients discharged from hospitals suffer medication related injury during the
first few weeks, with many of those injuries being preventable; and finding that
50.8% of 851 patients discharged following hospitalization for acute coronary
syndromes or acute decompensated heart failure “had 1 or more clinically
important medication errors during the 30 days after hospital discharge”);
Overland, supra note 18 (reporting a 20% thirty-day readmission rate for Medicare
Advantage patients); Pa. Patient Safety Auth., Leveraging Healthcare Policy Changes to
Decrease Hospital 30-Day Readmission Rates, 7 PENN. PATIENT SAFETY ADVISORY 1, 2
(2010) (reporting 57,852 readmissions in Pennsylvania in 2008, resulting in $2.5
billion in charges).
26. Jeffrey L. Greenwald et al., The Hospital Discharge: A Review of a High Risk Care
Transition with Highlights of a Reengineered Discharge Process, 3 J. PATIENT SAFETY 97, 97
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The “systems problems” associated with discharge may be
compounded by pressures from third-party payors to discharge
patients sooner to limit health care costs, even though this may make
patients more vulnerable to relapse by encouraging hospitals to
discharge them as quickly as possible.27 In addition, patients are
(2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Eric A. Coleman & Robert A. Berenson, Lost in
Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Improving the Quality of Transitional Care,
140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 533, 533 (2004) (“Quantitative evidence increasingly
indicates that patient safety is jeopardized during transitional care . . . . Qualitative
studies have consistently shown that patients and their caregivers are unprepared for
their role in the next care setting, do not understand essential steps in the
management of their condition, and cannot contact appropriate health care
practitioners for guidance.”); Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 2293 (explaining that the
quality of transition care needs improvement, noting that elderly patients often do
not receive ambulatory care prior to readmission and primary care physicians often
do not receive important discharge information about their patients); Jencks et al.,
supra note 25, at 1426 (concluding that rehospitalization rates could be reduced
based on five distinct lines of evidence); Jha et al., supra note 9, at 2638 (stating that
failures in the communication of discharge instructions, the reconciliation of
hospital and ambulatory records, and the arrangement of appropriate ambulatory
care follow-up has led to high readmission rates).
The “hospitalist movement” refers to the increasing likelihood that patients will be
treated by a hospital-based physician rather than by their community-based physician
while hospitalized. Proponents assert this increases efficiency and safety. See Robert
M. Wachter & Lee Goldman, The Emerging Role of “Hospitalists” in the American Health
Care System, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 514, 514 (1996) (asserting that one of the reasons
hospitalists are so efficient is because they can treat a large number of patients
promptly within one location); Robert M. Wachter & Lee Goldman, The Hospitalist
Movement 5 Years Later, 287 JAMA 487, 487–88, 493 (2002) (finding that the
“hospitalist movement” has increased efficiency without lowering the quality of care).
But see Shannon Pettypiece, Doctors Heavy Caseloads Put Patients at Risk, Study Shows,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0128/doctors-heavy-caseloads-put-patients-at-risk-study-shows.html (“Almost half of
hospital[-based] doctors said they routinely see more patients than they can safely
manage, leading in some cases to unneeded tests, medication errors and deaths,
according to a survey by researchers at Johns Hopkins University.”). Opponents cite
the handoffs from community physician to hospitalist and back again as a source of
discontinuity and potential medical error. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Coordinating
Care—A Perilous Journey Through the Health Care System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064,
1067 (2008) (recognizing the discontinuity that hospitalist care creates as the patient
goes from outpatient to inpatient and vice versa).
27. See EUGENE A. KROCH ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HOSPITAL
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT: TRENDS IN QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY ix (2007) (stating
that financial pressures on hospitals to reduce costs have caused a significant
reduction in the risk-adjusted length of stay over time); WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra
note 1, at 165 (“This problem [of missed handoffs at hospital discharge] has been
magnified in the last twenty years by the economic drive to discharge patients
promptly—‘sicker and quicker.’”); Ann Marie Marciarille, Healing Medicare Hospital
Recidivism: Causes and Cures, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 43 (2011) (“Contemporary
Medicare hospital discharge planning’s dangerous, expensive and oddly truncated
emphasis on acute care utilization review averts attention from promoting successful
reentry into the pre-acute care environment for the patient.”); Therese A. Stukel et
al., Association of Hospital Spending Intensity with Mortality and Readmission Rates in
Ontario Hospitals, 307 JAMA 1037, 1042 (2012) (finding that hospitals that spend
more on patient care had lower readmission rates and greater survival rates). But see
Lena M. Chen et al., Hospital Cost of Care, Quality of Care, and Readmission Rates: Penny
Wise and Pound Foolish?, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 340, 346 (2010) (“Most
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increasingly checking themselves out of hospitals against their
doctors’ advice, perhaps because they are responsible for their health
care costs and are concerned about paying for their hospital stay, or
perhaps because they have personal obligations outside the hospital.28
It is thus evident that the well-being of patients is jeopardized by
the prevailing discharge process and subsequent post-discharge
care,29 a scenario that can be attributed at least in part to the
inadequacy of existing legal doctrine regarding the division and
assignment of related responsibilities among the various relevant
health care providers.30 In general, this void leaves discharged
patients poorly protected from related harms, does nothing to
evidence did not support the penny-wise and pound-foolish hypothesis that low-cost
hospitals discharge patients earlier, only to increase readmission rates and incur
greater inpatient cost of care over time.”).
28. See William N. Southern et al., Increased Risk of Mortality and Readmission Among
Patients Discharged Against Medical Advice, 125 AM. J. MED. 594, 594 (2012) (explaining
that each year 500,000 patients are discharged from hospitals in the United States
against medical advice); Tara Parker-Pope, Leaving the Hospital Early, WELL N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/leavingthe-hospital-early/ (reporting a 40% increase in patients leaving a hospital against
medical advice from 1997 to 2008); see also ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FINANCIAL BURDEN OF MEDICAL CARE: EARLY RELEASE
OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY–JUNE 2011, at 1
(2012) (finding that one in three individuals was in a family experiencing a financial
burden resulting from medical care, one in five was in a family having problems
paying medical bills, one in four was in a family paying medical bills over time, and
one in ten was in a family that had medical bills they were unable to pay at all).
Indeed, patients discharging themselves against medical advice are at increased risk
of both readmission and death. See Southern et al., supra, at 597 (reporting 24.7% of
patients discharged against medical advice were readmitted within thirty days, and
1.3% died during this period, while the rates were 11.3% and 0.7%, respectively, for
patients who went home pursuant to a planned discharge). It is believed that these
patients often sign themselves out because they need to attend to personal
obligations such as work or caring for a family member. See Amy Norton, Patients
Leaving Hospital Against Advice Fare Worse, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-02/lifestyle/sns-rt-us-patients-leavinghospital
bre8410qy-20120502_1_hospital-patients-medical-advice-shorter-hospital (weighing
the risks of early discharge against the personal obligations to which patients must
attend).
29. See Jencks et al., supra note 25, at 1427 (“Rehospitalization is a frequent,
costly, and sometimes life-threatening event that is associated with gaps in followup care.”).
30. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 4–5 (stating that one of the most
significant problems is the lack of clarity as to who is responsible for post
discharge care, with accountability being scattered amongst hospital and
rehabilitation facility staff, community physicians and nurses, and the patients’
families). The lack of third-party reimbursement also significantly contributes to
a paucity of related services. See Ann Wilde Mathews, Why America’s Doctors Are
Struggling To Make Ends Meet: Some Upgrade Their Practices but Reimbursements Fall Short;
Dr. Hammond Feels the Squeeze, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2012, 1:06 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204603004577271340816194320.html
(reporting that traditional insurance contracts pay for face-to-face appointments
with patients, so practices are not reimbursed for calling a patient’s home and
other forms of follow-up care).
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address providers’ confusion about their respective duties, and fails to
give providers an incentive to supply needed information and services
to their patients.31 For the well-being of these patients, as well as for
the financial viability of the health care system as a whole,32 it is
critical that this void be filled.
The party best positioned to ensure that patients receive the
information and assistance they need both during and briefly
following discharge is the discharging hospital.33 Although courts
31. Traditionally in a fee-for-service payment system, a perverse incentive exists
for hospitals to not assist recently discharged patients, as hospitals can receive greater
overall compensation if discharged patients relapse and return requiring more
services. Indeed, “health care professionals receive a premium for a defective
product; physicians and hospitals can bill for the additional services that are needed
when patients are injured by their mistakes.” Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick,
Five Years After To Err Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2384,
2388 (2005); see also INST. OF MED., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING
INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE (2006) (encouraging a pay for performance system to
promote quality care). Provisions in the PPACA seek to counter this perverse
incentive. See PATRICIA A. DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41196, MEDICARE
PROVISIONS IN THE PPACA: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS
23 (2010) (clarifying that under the PPACA, Medicare payments will be reduced
based on the percentage of potentially preventable Medicare readmissions).
32. Increasing health care costs, which currently consume more than 17% of
the Gross Domestic Product of the United States, have become a matter of
growing concern.
See NHE Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:34 AM),
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html (reporting national health
expenditures were $2.7 trillion in 2011 or 17.9% of GDP); see also CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 1 (2007), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-lthealth.pdf (reporting that the growth of spending on health care in the United States
has outpaced economic growth for many years). As a result, patients and their family
members are having an increasingly difficult time paying for their medical bills. See
COHEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (finding that more than one in five Americans in
2010 struggled to pay their medical bills). In 2007, 62.1% of all personal
bankruptcies in the United States were related to illness and medical bills, an
increase of 49.6% from 2001, while in 1981 these were the cause of only 8% of all
bankruptcies. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States,
2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741, 744 (2009). At the same
time, hospitals are facing increasing financial pressures of their own. See QUORUM
HEALTH RES., HOSPITAL BANKRUPTCY: WHAT BOARD MEMBERS, EXECUTIVES, AND OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS NEED TO KNOW 2 (2011) (stating that forty-two acute care hospitals
filed for federal bankruptcy protection between 2000 and 2006, and industry analysts
foresee hospitals’ financial health continuing to decline).
33. See, e.g., GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 (“As the largest and most
comprehensive providers of health care services, hospitals are increasingly seen as
one of the most important potential foci of accountability for care of patient
populations that should extend beyond the hospital walls to include community
providers and caregivers.”). Although this Article frequently uses the term
“hospital” for grammatical efficiency, its arguments should not be read as
applicable solely to traditional general hospitals. This Article’s assertions are also
germane to specialty hospitals, outpatient clinics, and other types of facilities that
provide intensive health care services and often possess similar relevant
characteristics. A full discussion of the applicability of these ideas to hospital-like
facilities is beyond the scope of this Article.
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applying a theory of corporate liability have widely established that
hospitals have several enforceable duties to the patients cared for in
their facilities, they have generally not addressed what duties may be
owed beyond the point of discharge.34 This Article asserts that the steady
historical expansion of hospitals’ services and their corresponding
legal duties to patients has reached a point in today’s medical
environment where hospitals have assumed, and patients expect
them to assume, a more central role in the delivery of health care
than ever before—a role that increasingly can be seen as fiduciary in
nature.35 It further argues that formally recognizing this fiduciary
relationship with respect to a hospital’s recently discharged patients
will not only enhance the well-being of these patients, but also
improve the financial position of hospitals and the healthcare system
as a whole.36
I.

THE PROBLEM OF POST-DISCHARGE INJURY: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES

A patient’s discharge from the hospital is an especially critical
transition point, one where the patient is particularly vulnerable to
the problems that plague health care transitions in general.37 Health
care transitions of all kinds are notorious risk factors for patient
injury and are responsible for an estimated 80% of all serious medical
errors.38 The Hand-off Communications Project of The Joint
34. For a discussion of various hospital duties required by law, see infra notes
111–15 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text; Part IV (describing the
expansion of hospital corporate liability).
36. Undertaking this responsibility can benefit hospitals that might otherwise
incur significant financial losses associated with readmissions of patients unable to
pay for the care received, penalties under the PPACA and other mechanisms,
diminished standing in the community, or jeopardized accreditation or certification.
See infra Parts II–IV (detailing the potential financial losses associated with
inadequate discharge and post-discharge procedures). With regard to the health
care system as a whole, one of the primary reasons so much attention has been
devoted to readmissions is their considerable cost, estimated at over thirty billion
dollars a year, which could be avoided and is contributing to concerns about runaway health care costs in general. See supra notes 7–8, 17, 32 and accompanying text.
37. See Greenwald et al., supra note 26, at 97 (pointing to discontinuity and
fragmentation of care as the primary causes of high readmission rates); see also supra
notes 20–26 and accompanying text; infra Part II (describing the lack of legal tools
available to patients injured by inadequate post-discharge care).
38. Press Release, Joint Comm’n Ctr for. Transforming Healthcare, Joint Comm’n
Ctr. for Transforming Healthcare Tackles Miscommunication Among Caregivers (Oct.
21, 2010), available at http://www.pwrnewmedia.com/2010/joint
commission_01021_miscommunication/index.html; see also Mary Ann Friesen et al.,
Handoffs: Implications for Nurses, in PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED
HANDBOOK FOR NURSES 1, 1 (Ronda G. Hughes ed., 2008) (reviewing reports of the
risks associated with hospital handoffs); Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 1064
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Commission, a not-for-profit organization that examines, as part of its
accreditation program, the quality of care provided by health care
facilities across the country, found in a study of ten participating
hospitals that “more than 37 percent of the time hand-offs were
defective and didn’t allow the receiver to safely care for the patient.”39
Because discharge removes the patient from a hospital’s internal
monitoring systems, this can prove even more dangerous than intrafacility transitions and has been described as a “perfect storm” with
risks of “loose ends,” communication problems, poor quality
information and preparation, and fragmented care.40
From the patients’ perspective, even when properly executed,
discharge can be a difficult and stressful time.41 Patients may still be
suffering lingering pain, discomfort, and vulnerability from their
health problems and subsequent treatment,42 and they may be
confused and distracted by the bustle of events surrounding the
transition.43 In addition, they may also be dreading what awaits
them upon their return home, including unfulfilled work
obligations, disrupted family relations, unpaid bills, and personal
(analyzing research that strongly suggests failures in coordination of care are both
common and serious threats to the quality of patient care); Coleman et al., supra note
25, at 1822 (explaining that patient transitions between different settings are
vulnerable periods when the quality of care and patient safety may be compromised).
39. Press Release, Joint Comm’n Ctr. for Transforming Healthcare, supra note
38; see also Barrett T. Kitch et al., Handoffs Causing Patient Harm: A Survey of Medical
and Surgical House Staff, 34 JOINT COMM’N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 563 (2008)
(expounding that hospitals are failing to observe the best practices for patient
handoffs).
40. Re-engineered Discharge Project Dramatically Reduces Return Trips to the Hospital,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (March 2011), http://www.ahrq.gov/research
/mar11/0311RA1.htm.
41. The term “home” is used to indicate a placement somewhere in the
community following a hospital discharge, including but not limited to rehabilitative
centers, nursing homes, and the patient’s private residence. Each of these may pose
unique hand-off challenges. See Friesen et al., supra note 38, at 1–2 (explaining that
handoffs are largely dependent on the experience and skill of the caregivers,
particularly their interpersonal communication skills, and noting factors that make
these handoffs difficult).
42. See Preetha Basaviah & Mark V. Williams, Hospital Discharge, in HOSPITAL
MEDICINE 31, 31 (Robert M. Wachter et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (describing the pain
and confusion that discharged patients suffer shortly thereafter).
43. See Lara Alspaugh, A Guide for Nurses: Teaching Healthcare Effectively to Patients,
HEALTH CAREERS J. (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.healthcareersjournal.com/a-guide-fornurses-teaching-healthcare-effectively-to-patients (suggesting effective communication
strategies for the explanation of post-discharge care instructions to patients); Nicole
Higgins DeSmet, After Stints in Hospital, Facing a Fight with Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011,
at A39 (recounting the financial struggles of an elderly man following a hospital stay).
Indeed, the discharge process itself can be an unpleasant and disturbing experience. See
Melanie Henwood, Problems Leaving Hospital Will Be a Lasting Memory for Patients,
GUARDIAN: JOE PUBLIC BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/
joepublic/2011/sep/13/hospital-patients-discharge-problems (recounting the stress that
comes with leaving the hospital after treatment).
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challenges such as adapting to reduced mobility, strength,
endurance, and mental acuity.44
It is during this challenging and sometimes chaotic transition
period that patients are expected to assume greater responsibility for
their own care, a task made even more difficult by one of the major
causes of post-discharge injury: miscommunications between health
care providers and their patients.45 Even when a hospital provides
complete and accurate instructions at discharge,46 these instructions
can be difficult for patients to understand, remember, and follow.47
Many patients are given a host of complex and potentially confusing
instructions regarding (a) signs that their condition is worsening, (b)
obtaining and administering prescribed medications or other
treatment and cautions about their side effects, (c) recommended
changes in life style or behavior, (d) the value and use of various
medical or monitoring devices, and (e) the need to return for
periodic check-ups or additional care.48 Though complex and often
44. See Basaviah & Williams, supra note 42, at 31 (noting that many patients
continue to feel unwell after discharge but are expected to follow complex regimes
of medication, as well as schedule and obtain needed follow-up visits and tests);
Karen Grimmer et al., Experiences of Elderly Patients Regarding Independent Community
Living After Discharge from Hospital: A Longitudinal Study, 16 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY
HEALTH CARE 465, 467 (2004) (explaining that patients face many immediate
problems upon discharge, including obtaining and preparing food, paying bills,
transporting themselves, maintaining their household, and completing other basic
daily tasks).
45. See Grimmer et al., supra note 44, at 467 (noting that “short hospital
admissions, the general busyness of hospital staff, and patients’ ill health most likely
constrained patient involvement in discharge planning”); Kripalani et al., supra note
6, at 314–15 (observing the challenges faced by patients and their families once
responsibility for care is transferred from the inpatient provider or hospitalist to the
patient or community care provider).
46. See To Avoid a Return Trip to the Hospital, Take Action Before You Are Discharged,
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/to-avoid-a-return-trip-to-the-hospital-take-action-before-you-aredischarged/2012/01/25/gIQAjqvw7R_story.html (“[Although] Medicare regulations
require hospitals to have a process for all patients to receive written discharge
instructions, including lists of follow-up appointments, medication and dosage
directions[,] . . . those plans are often incomplete.”).
47. See Sandra G. Boodman, Many Americans Have Poor Health Literacy, WASH.
POST (Feb. 28, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/28/AR2011022805957.html (reporting that 36% of adults have only
basic or below-basic skills for comprehending written health materials, meaning that
ninety million Americans understand discharge instructions only when written at a
fifth-grade level or lower); see also Overland, supra note 18 (explaining that discharge
instructions are often hard to understand and thus difficult for patients to follow);
Robert Preidt, Poor Reading Skills Might Be Fatal for Older Folks: Inability To Understand
Medical Instructions Associated with Higher Death Rates in 5-year Study, HEALTHDAY NEWS
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/Article.asp?AID=662789 (noting
that being unable to read medical instructions may actually cause death in elderly
people).
48. Increasing numbers of patients are receiving “complete written discharge
instructions,” which include information on “activity level, diet, discharge
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voluminous, all of this information is critical; for example, many
prescription medicines can do more harm than good if the patient is
not given careful instructions and cautioned to watch for possible
complications.49
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the amount and detail of the
information involved, miscommunication between health care
providers and their patients at this stage is extremely common.50 In
one study, 95% of surveyed primary care nurses believed their
patients understood the important side effects of their medications at
the time of discharge, but the researchers discovered that only 57%
of the patients actually did.51 Similarly, 99% of the nurses believed
that their patients understood when it would be safe to resume
normal activities, while only about 50% of the patients had an
accurate understanding of this safety issue.52 Another study showed
that physicians correctly assessed their patients’ understanding of
discharge information only 2% of the time.53 Tellingly, there is even

medications, follow-up appointment, weight monitoring, and actions to take if
symptoms worsen.” AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT, 2011, at 173–74 & fig.6.1 (2012), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/qrdr11.htm; see also Rebecca Hendren, Prevent
Readmissions with Nurse Intervention, HEALTHLEADERS M EDIA (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/NRS-271422/Prevent-ReadmissionsWith-Nurse-Intervention (“Many patients with chronic illnesses face complicated
medication regimens they may not understand . . . or wonder what to do about
prescriptions they had been taking before hospitalization.”).
49. See WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 1, at 71–72 (explaining that 5% of
hospital patients have experienced an adverse drug event partially due to the
ubiquitous use of medications in modern medicine); Amy L. Friedman et al.,
Medication Errors in the Outpatient Setting: Classification and Root Cause Analysis, 142
ARCHIVES SURGERY 278 (2007) (finding that outpatient medication errors are
frequent with significant adverse effects and are often linked to the health care
system); Overland, supra note 18 (reporting that the most common cause of
unnecessary readmissions is a medication management mistake, including “taking
too many meds, taking meds that are contraindicated or not taking enough meds,”
with many patients left struggling to reconcile new and old prescriptions).
50. Coleman & Berenson, supra note 26, at 533 (describing the challenge of
transitioning from the passive “patient” role to assuming a “self-management” role
following discharge). The content and the language of discharge instructions need
not even be complicated to result in misunderstanding. See Boodman, supra note 47,
(“When we say ‘diet,’ we mean ‘food,’ but patients think we mean going on a diet.
And when we say ‘exercise,’ we may mean ‘walking,’ but patients think we mean
‘going to the gym.’ At every step there’s a potential for misunderstanding.”).
51. Peggy Reiley et al., Discharge Planning: Comparison of Patients’ and Nurses’
Perceptions of Patients Following Hospital Discharge, 28 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 143, 146
(1996).
52. Id.
53. See Basaviah & Williams, supra note 42, at 33; see also Kripalani et al., supra
note 6, at 319–20 (observing that physicians often fail to adequately solicit questions
from patients regarding their post-discharge care).
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some evidence that patients themselves may not be any better at
judging their own level of understanding.54
Flawed communication between patients and health care providers
is far from the only problem that can lead to post-discharge injury. A
lack of communication between hospital physicians and the
community physicians who assume responsibility for discharged
patients is also the cause of many adverse events.55 A study at the
Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City found that 49% of
discharged hospital patients who saw their primary care physician
within two months of discharge experienced a medical error that
could be attributed to a discontinuity of care in the transition from
inpatient to outpatient care.56 A “medication continuity error” was
experienced by 42% of these patients, 8% experienced a “test
follow-up error” (including 41% of the patients with tests pending
at discharge), and 12% experienced a “work-up error” (including
22% of the patients with a planned outpatient work-up at
discharge).57 Patients with a work-up error were 6.2 times more
likely to be re-hospitalized within three months after their first postdischarge visit with their primary care physician, 2.5 times more
likely to be hospitalized if they experienced a medication continuity
error, and 2.4 times more likely to be hospitalized if they
experienced a test follow-up error.58 Other studies have reported
that less than half of all community-based primary care providers
receive information about discharge medications and plans for their
recently hospitalized patients.59
54. See Kirsten G. Engel et al., Patient Comprehension of Emergency Department Care
and Instructions: Are Patients Aware of When They Do Not Understand?, 53 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 454, 459 (2009) (finding that most patients demonstrated
comprehension deficiencies that the patients themselves did not perceive).
55. See Alicia Gallegos, Communication Key to Reducing Liability Claims in Patient
Handoffs, AM. MED. NEWS (June 20, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011
/06/20/prca0620.htm (reporting that while almost 70% of physicians claim to
regularly send patient history information to specialists, only about 35% of specialists
report regularly receiving such information).
56. See Carlton Moore et al., Medical Errors Related to Discontinuity of Care from an
Inpatient to an Outpatient Setting, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 646, 647–48 (2003) (listing
the categories of medical errors, including medication continuity, test follow-up, and
work-up errors).
57. Id. at 648–49.
58. Id. at 649.
59. See R. J. Mageean, Study of “Discharge Communications” from Hospital, 293 BRIT.
MED. J. 1283, 1283 (1986) (noting that 53% of the patients had contacted their
general practitioner after discharge before the general practitioner received any
information regarding the discharge); Stephen Wilson et al., General PractitionerHospital Communications: A Review of Discharge Summaries, 21 J. QUALITY CLINICAL PRAC.
104, 104 (2001) (finding that discharge summaries were received by only 27.1% of
patient-nominated general practitioners, and that less than two-thirds of those
actually received were rated as accurate).
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The misuse of complex medical devices at home can be yet another
source of post-discharge injury. As a result of hospitals discharging
patients after increasingly shorter stays, more patients are recovering
and continuing post-operative care at home with the assistance of
sophisticated medical equipment.60 It is estimated that 7.6 million
individuals in the United States each year receive home health-care
from one of 17,000 agencies and, in addition, an unpaid family
caregiver is present in approximately thirty-six million American
households.61 A medical device is used in a majority of these homes,
but frequently only limited information or instruction is provided on
the use of these devices, even when a home health-care agency is
involved.62 These devices, the operation of which may be confusing
for patients, can pose significant health risks: the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) alone received 19,000 reports of adverse events
involving medical devices used in homes between 1997 and 2009.63
When medical devices in the home fail or are used improperly, the
results can be catastrophic.64 One case reported to the FDA involved
a patient who failed to remove a cap from the line on a drug infusion
pump, resulting in a blockage of the flow of medication and the
patient’s subsequent hospitalization.65 Another patient incorrectly
connected the lines for overnight dialysis and died of blood loss.66 It
60. See Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Pushes Oversight of Devices, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870467190457
5194310283186290.html (stating that the FDA received more than 19,000 reports
of adverse events involving home medical devices from 1997 to 2009); Molly
Follette Story, Medical Devices in Home Health Care, in THE ROLE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN
HOME HEALTH CARE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 145, 147 (2010) (attributing the rise in
outpatient care to the climbing cost of health care services and shortage of
healthcare facilities and skilled personnel); Edward P. Richards & Charles Walter,
High Tech Devices in Low Tech Environments: The Lay Use of Medical Devices, IEEE
ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY MAG. Dec. 1989, at 60, 60 (noting that efforts to further
“cost containment” in healthcare created the “new phenomenon” of home medical
devices).
61. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MEDICAL DEVICE HOME USE INITIATIVE 2–3 (2010).
62. See Story, supra note 60, at 147–48 (outlining that some medical devices may
not be the best fit for users because of the limited support, education, and training
provided them); Dooren, supra note 60 (stating that complicated devices pose health
risks to at-home patients).
63. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 5; see also Jim
Spencer & Janet Moore, GAO Adds to Concerns About Medical Device Approval Process:
Reviewers Criticize Process that Requires No Human Testing, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.startribune.com/business/119786949.html?refer=y (noting that in April
2011 government reviewers stated that the “process for ensuring the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices remains suspect”).
64. See CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 5 (giving
examples of catastrophic adverse events that occurred when at-home patients used
medical devices).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
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has been noted that most of these devices were approved by the FDA
for use by medical personnel in hospitals, not by the average person
in his or her home.67
While the potentially life-threatening health risks to patients who
suffer post-discharge adverse events are perhaps self-evident, there
are other troubling consequences. One such consequence is the
potential need for hospital readmission, which the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) of the CMS identified as the source
of billions of dollars of unnecessary annual health care
expenditures.68 In today’s cost-conscious debates over health care,
the expensive nature of readmissions has led to their increased
scrutiny by politicians and researchers alike.69 For example, a recent
MedPAC study determined that while the average duration of
hospital stays by heart-failure patients has decreased, the likelihood of
their returning to the hospital for additional care within a month of
their initial treatment has increased.70 Another report received
considerable attention for its finding that readmission rates either
held steady or increased in many places around the country from
2004 to 2009.71 Harlan Krumholz, a Yale University cardiologist and
senior author of the MedPAC study, concluded that “hospitals need
to invest more effort and resources to make sure ‘the transition to

67. Id. at 4.
68. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 103 (2007) (reporting that 17.6% of
admissions result in $15 billion in readmission spending).
This report
recommended that the Medicare payment system be revised to incentivize hospitals
to reduce their readmission rates. See id. at 114–18 (comparing a penalty-only
approach to a reward and penalty approach to incentivize hospitals). Ultimately, this
and other studies formed the foundation for the PPACA’s financial penalty on
hospitals with “excess readmissions.” See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see
also Bernard Friedman & Jayasree Basu, The Rate and Cost of Hospital Readmissions for
Preventable Conditions, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 225, 233 (2004) (reporting that
19.4% of patients were readmitted during the six months following discharge, with
more than two-thirds of readmissions occurring in the first three months and
accounting for $729 million in additional hospital costs or about $7,400 per
readmission); supra notes 7, 32 and accompanying text.
69. Nazima Allaudeen et al., Inability of Providers To Predict Unplanned Readmissions,
26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 771, 771 (2011); Robert P. Kocher & Eli Y. Adashi, Hospital
Readmissions and the Affordable Care Act: Paying for Coordinated Quality Care, 306 JAMA
1794, 1794 (2011).
70. See Héctor Bueno et al., Trends in Length of Stay and Short-term Outcomes Among
Medicare Patients Hospitalized for Heart Failure, 1993–2006, 303 JAMA 2141, 2141, 2143–
45 (2010) (noting that while the mean length of stay of 8.8 days in 1993 dropped to
6.3 days in 2006, the readmission rate increased from 17.2% to 20.1%).
71. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 15 (finding that “[t]here was little
change in the U.S. 30-day readmission rates [for Medicare patients], regardless of the
cause of the initial hospitalization”).
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outpatient status goes smoothly.’”72 Dr. Krumholz adds that hospitals
generally have not, until recently, tracked patients after discharge
and that rather than reinstitute longer hospitalizations, the better
remedy is to develop systems that make discharges safer.73
As studies have highlighted the high rate, adverse impact, and
significant costs of hospital readmissions, pilot programs have
emerged to help prevent avoidable readmissions.74 Furthermore, as
previously noted, the PPACA seeks to reduce preventable
readmissions as part of its effort to control health care costs and
improve patient safety by reducing payments to hospitals with “excess
readmissions.”75 In addition, The Joint Commission, which accredits
and certifies more than 18,000 health care organizations and
programs in the United States and is widely recognized as a guardian
of the quality of health care, has also recognized the importance of
enhancing the quality of post-discharge care.76 In its 2011 Annual
Report on quality and safety standards governing hospitals, The Joint
Commission noted the inclusion of the performance measure of
“[p]ost discharge continuing care plan[s],”77 which assesses whether
the hospital has such a plan in place and, as a separate measure,
examines whether that plan was subsequently transmitted to its
patients or to their community-based health care providers.78
72. Ron Winslow, The Revolving Door at the Hospital: While Patient Stays Shorten,
Readmission Rates Rise; Where’s the Savings?, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2010, at D3 (quoting
Dr. Krumholz in an interview). Dr. Krumholz further asserts that while shorter
hospital stays may reduce up-front costs, the resulting larger “downstream costs” have
led to an overall increase in health care costs. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Johnson, supra note 13 (discussing pilot programs that will allow nurses to
be alerted electronically when signs of heart failure arise); see also supra note 18. Of
course, not all hospital readmissions are preventable. See Walraven et al., supra note
25, at 1211–13 (analyzing data and concluding that only a portion of readmissions
are avoidable).
A parallel approach to prevent readmissions involves the
establishment of “medical homes” for patients, where community-based physicians
provide direction, and their staff is expected to contact patients at home and
coordinate care. See Mathews, supra note 30 (explaining the benefits of establishing
“medical home[s]” for patients, and the role of medical staff). Such efforts are
reportedly hindered by a lack of funding. See id. (explaining that one difficulty with
the “medical home” approach is procuring insurance company reimbursements for
related expenses). In addition, these physicians are often not well positioned to
provide these services. See infra Part III (reviewing the history of the modern hospital
business model and advancing the idea of a fiduciary hospital-patient relationship
much like the fiduciary doctor-patient relationship).
75. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
76. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 131 (2000) (explaining that The
Joint Commission accredits hospitals and that quality assurance requirements and
improvement programs are included in the accreditation standards).
77. JOINT COMM’N, IMPROVING AMERICA’S HOSPITALS: THE JOINT COMMISSION’S
ANNUAL REPORT ON QUALITY AND SAFETY 35 (2011).
78. See id. at 35 (defining a post discharge continuing health plan as:
“[c]ommunication from the hospital to the next health provider after a patient is
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Given all that is known about the frequency, severity, and costs of
preventable post-discharge injuries, there can be little doubt that they
pose a serious problem, both for individual patients and the health
care system as a whole. Unfortunately, the predominant existing
legal remedies offer little hope of providing a satisfactory remedy.79
II. APPLICABILITY OF CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINES TO POSTDISCHARGE INJURY
Several legal tools are currently available to discharged patients
who believe they have been wrongfully injured by the acts or
omissions of their health care provider, including lawsuits that target
(1) the patient’s physician, asserting the physician failed to meet the
relevant standard of care; (2) the discharging hospital, seeking to
impose vicarious liability for the negligence of health care providers
acting as the hospital’s actual or apparent agents; and (3) the
discharging hospital, attempting to hold it directly liable for a failure
to take adequate steps to protect patients from harm.80 This section
briefly examines the capacity of each of these mechanisms to
incentivize conduct that will reduce the likelihood of post-discharge
discharged from the hospital. The plan must contain the reason for hospitalization,
main diagnosis at discharge, a list of medications at discharge, and recommendations
for the next level of care”).
79. Compelled action does not provide the only means for addressing these
problems. Indeed, considerable attention has been given to educating and
persuading relevant parties to voluntarily undertake efforts to address them. See
supra notes 18, 74–78 and accompanying text (describing programs aimed to prevent
avoidable readmissions). However, the continuing high rates of readmissions suggest
that voluntary efforts have not been sufficient. See supra notes 6, 22–26, 50–73 and
accompanying text (presenting the volume at which excessive rehospitalizations
occur).
Based on currently available data, there is little reason to conclude that any of
these approaches have been widely successful or have had a significant impact on
changing current practices. See supra notes 6–8, 22–26, 51–73 and accompanying text
(presenting the continued rate of post-discharge preventable accidents, and the
disconnect between patient and hospital staff of patient’s condition upon discharge).
It may be that these penalties and rewards do not outweigh existing incentives. See
infra Part II (applying current law to post-discharge injuries). Furthermore, none of
these approaches provide compensation to injured patients. See infra Part III
(exploring the fiduciary duty of modern hospitals).
80. With regard to hospitals specifically, they also could be subjected to a loss of
Joint Commission accreditation or CMS certification. See supra notes 76–78 and
accompanying text (explaining The Joint Commission’s requirements and analysis of
post-discharge continuing care plans). However, there is little indication that
accreditation will be withheld from a hospital for a failure to engage in postdischarge activities. Similarly, the federal government can withhold payments from
hospitals with excess readmission rates, although there are few signs thus far that this
has had a significant impact on readmission rates. See supra notes 11–12, 69 and
accompanying text (discussing how programs have attempted to incentivize
preventing readmissions by reducing funding to those entities with excessive
readmission levels, but these efforts thus far have not proven successful).
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injury and compensate patients who receive inadequate discharge
and post-discharge assistance.
A. Lawsuits Targeting the Patient’s Physician
Medical malpractice suits81 aimed at either the physician who
treated the patient while hospitalized or the patient’s communitybased physician might seem, on their face, to provide a remedy that
will compensate patients for post-discharge injury and encourage
other physicians to better attend to the needs of their own discharged
patients to avoid liability.82 Ostensibly, a physician who provided
treatment to a patient while hospitalized and who was, or should have
been, involved in the discharge process but failed to meet the
requisite standard of care associated with hospital discharges could
be found liable for resulting injuries incurred by the patient.83 The
81. To establish a medical malpractice claim, traditionally the patient must first
show that an express or implied patient-physician relationship existed at the time
that the asserted malpractice occurred. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 260–61
(discussing the creation of an implied contract between patient and physician).
Once the relationship is established, the physician must meet the applicable standard
of care, typically defined as exercising the degree of skill, care, and diligence
ordinarily provided by a physician with similar training under similar circumstances.
See id. at 264–66 (explaining that liability relies on general negligence standards of
care, which are in essence set by the medical profession itself). If a breach of the
standard of care is the proximate cause of injuries to the patient, the patient is
entitled to be compensated by the physician. See id. at 301 (presenting the elements
of a malpractice tort claim).
82. See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2205 (2006)
(asserting that the tort system can improve patient safety by reducing injuries and
increasing communication, while providing compensation for those injured).
83. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming
that physicians have a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in making
recommendations to discharge a patient); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819
(Ct. App. 1986) (determining that when physicians discharge a patient they cannot
avoid responsibility for the patient’s care, even when the discharge reflects
limitations imposed by a third party payer); Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852, 863–64
(Colo. App. 2008) (accepting a jury verdict finding physicians who controlled a
patient’s discharge to be negligent); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 93 (Kan.
1983) (“Liability predicated upon negligent release of a patient . . . is a medical
malpractice action.”); Samuel v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 757 So. 2d 43, 47–48
(La. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding a verdict that the discharge instructions given to a
patient by the treating physician were inadequate and constituted a breach of care);
Bell v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 787, 794 (App. Div. 1982) (“[It is
a physician’s] duty to rest his decision to release the patient upon a careful and
competent examination”).
Alternatively, the failure to provide discharge and post-discharge assistance could
be framed as a breach of a physician’s duty not to abandon a patient, which in turn
could serve as a basis for imposing license-related sanctions. See AMA CODE OF MED.
ETHICS Opinion 10.01(5) (1993) (recognizing patients’ right to continuity of health
care “as long as further treatment is medically indicated”). However, hospitals are
not subject to these ethical codes or their sanctions, and physicians are generally not
the best-positioned parties to supply this assistance. See infra notes 87–95 and
accompanying text (explaining the difficulties in holding hospitals to these ethical
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fact that an injury to a patient does not manifest until sometime after
the patient’s discharge does not present an inherent obstacle to a
traditional malpractice suit against the hospital-linked physician.84
Alternatively, a community-based physician with whom the patient
had established a continuing physician-patient relationship prior to
hospitalization could be held liable for post-discharge injuries if that
physician failed to meet the standard of care applicable under such
circumstances, for example, by failing to schedule a needed
appointment or otherwise adequately monitor the patient following
discharge.85 Thus, when the medical malpractice of these physicians
is arguably the cause of a post-discharge injury, it would seem that a
well-established mechanism is in place to provide a remedy.86
codes, as well as the difficulties of identifying the treating doctor and requiring these
doctors to implement post-discharge support on a wide-spread basis).
84. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 248 (4th ed. 1971)
(explaining that proximate cause is not time-sensitive; liability can be incurred so
long as the “‘condition’ remains static”). Additionally, the statute of limitations for
filing medical malpractice suits typically does not begin to run until patients discover
or should have discovered that they suffered harm. FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at
300–01.
85. See, e.g., Dunning v. Kerzner, 910 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.8 (1st Cir. 1990)
(recognizing and citing other courts that have determined that a physician’s duty of
care encompasses follow-up care); Lauderdale v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1511,
1515 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (determining that a physician has a responsibility to stress the
importance of returning for a follow-up appointment to assess the effectiveness of a
tentative treatment for a serious condition); Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa
1991) (stating that a physician who “leaves a patient in a critical stage of a disease
without reason or sufficient notice to enable the patient to secure another physician”
is liable).
86. An informed consent cause of action might also be pursued against a
physician for failing to adequately disclose the risks associated with discharge and
steps that should be taken to minimize them. See, e.g., Bubb v. Brusky, 768 N.W.2d
903, 923–24 (Wis. 2009) (explaining that a physician failed to adequately inform the
patient when he did not present alternate forms of treatment before discharging the
patient). However, this cause of action is usually associated with the commencement
of treatment rather than its conclusion. See, e.g., Hall, 190 P.3d at 864–65 (stating
that informed consent claims often arise out of a performed procedure, while those
arising from a misdiagnosed condition are often negligence claims); see also Thomas
L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an
Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1205–06 (2009)
(explaining that lawsuits focusing on the nondisclosure of an emergent medical risk
should consider both the time during and after the period of treatment). Further,
this cause of action can generally only be brought against the treating health care
provider rather than the hospital where treatment was provided. See FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 76, at 338 (noting that hospitals have no duty to obtain informed
consent); see, e.g., Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 791 (Conn. 2006)
(finding that nearly every jurisdiction that has considered the issue has concluded
that it is the nonemployee treating physician’s duty and not the hospital’s to obtain
the patient’s informed consent when necessary). But see Sherwood, 896 A.2s at 790–
91 & n.19 (leaving open the possibility that the involvement of hospitalemployed nurses or physicians may give rise to a hospital’s vicarious duty to
obtain informed consent).
Alternatively, a cause of action might allege the discharge effectively constituted
patient abandonment. See supra note 83 (noting a physician’s duty not to abandon a
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Yet evidence suggests that post-discharge injury, despite being
relatively easy to prevent in many cases, is often not readily
attributable to the negligence of a particular physician. Patients can
be injured as a result of forgetting or misunderstanding instructions
about post-discharge activities, missing or never scheduling important
follow-up appointments and procedures, or failing to recognize
warning signs in time to avoid severe complications.87 While
patient after forming a physician-patient relationship); see also Ending the PatientPhysician Relationship, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/ending-patientphysician-relationship.page (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“Once a patient-physician
relationship is begun, a physician generally is under both an ethical and legal
obligation to provide services as long as the patient needs them.”). Here too, such a
suit would generally only be able to reach a treating physician rather than the
hospital. In addition, hospital-linked physicians will argue that their relationship was
understood to terminate at discharge, and community-based physicians will argue
their relationship was superseded when the patient was hospitalized and does not
resume until they again provide medical services to the patient. See, e.g., Ricks v.
Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211–12 (Utah 1937) (recognizing that the law allows for a
physician’s obligations to cease when, for example, the patient-doctor relationship
ends); FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 260 (“[Physicians] have no obligation to
offer . . . services outside the scope of the original physician-patient agreement . . . .”).
A patient might also bring a cause of action pursuant to the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which authorizes private rights of action if a
patient who has come to a hospital’s emergency department (ED) is not
appropriately screened and is discharged or transferred without an emergency
medical condition being stabilized. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (b), (d)(2)(A),
(d)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring hospitals to screen and stabilize emergency conditions,
and allowing for civil actions to be brought against a hospital for injury stemming
from a failure to do so). However, if the patient’s emergency medical condition has
been stabilized, as is typically the case at discharge, EMTALA is not applicable. See,
e.g., Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that Congress did not require emergency rooms to continue
treatment when a patient is believed to be stable); Morgan v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1357 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (“EMTALA does not require a
hospital to diagnose a patient’s medical conditions properly or to treat them
competently . . . .”), aff’d, 225 F. App’x 828 (11th Cir. 2007). But see Special
Responsibilities of Medicare Hospitals in Emergency Cases:
Application to
Inpatients—Admitted Emergency Patients, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,105, 31,496 (May 9,
2002) (stating that a hospital’s special responsibilities under EMTALA are satisfied
after it documents the stabilization of a patient admitted as an inpatient with an
unstable emergency medical condition). Furthermore, some courts have ruled
that EMTALA only governs discharges or transfers from the ED, and thus is not
applicable to discharges from elsewhere within the hospital. See Thornton v. Sw.
Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990) (ascertaining that Congress
intended for the requirements of the Act to only pertain to the ED, and not to the
other parts of the hospital).
87. See, e.g., COMM. ON HEALTH LITERACY & BD. ON NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. HEALTH,
HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END CONFUSION 19 (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al.
eds., 2004) [hereinafter HEALTH LITERACY] (recounting an instance where a mother
could not determine how her two-year-old daughter should take her prescribed
medication for an ear infection and simply poured the antibiotic into her child’s ear);
Amita Chugh et al., Better Transitions: Improving Comprehension of Discharge Instructions,
25 FRONTIERS HEALTH SERVS. MGMT. 11, 12 (2009) (telling the story of a distraught
older man who admitted he had not been taking his pills to manage his heart
condition because he had never learned how to read and thus could not understand
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physicians may have a duty to adequately instruct patients about postdischarge care,88 instructions alone are often not enough to avert
In addition, the patient’s hospital
avoidable patient injury.89
physician may not even be involved in the discharge process, with
hospital staff generally responsible for discharge preparations.90 Even
when physicians are involved, it may be difficult to ascertain which of
multiple physicians who provided treatment to a patient during a
hospital stay failed to adequately prepare the patient for discharge.91
Further, it would be unreasonable to expect hospital-linked or
community-based physicians to effectively monitor and provide postdischarge support to discharged patients on a wide-spread basis.92
the accompanying instructions); Carol Einhorn, Do Our Patients Hear What We Teach?,
ONCOLINK,
http://www.oncolink.org/coping/article.cfm?c=1&s=39&ss=85&id=456
(last modified June 24, 2005) (detailing a situation where a patient, despite being given
repeated instructions on how to dress a wound and stating that he understood the
instructions, was found applying the wrapper and throwing away the dressing itself).
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. But see supra note 86 (noting
that hospital-linked physicians may assert that their duties are limited to the
duration of the hospitalization).
89. See supra note 87. Moreover, action or inaction by a patient that could not
reasonably have been foreseen will generally be viewed as an intervening cause that
relieves the physician of liability. See Bell v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 456
N.Y.S.2d 787, 796–97 (App. Div. 1982) (reiterating that intervening acts can relieve a
defendant from liability, but also noting that if the intervening act was “set in
motion” by the defendant’s acts then the defendant will not be relieved of liability);
FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 296 (stating that the doctrine of contributory
negligence may apply when a patient fails to follow a physician’s instructions,
including failing to see the physician or another health care provider as instructed).
However, “[c]ourts are reluctant to apply contributory negligence too liberally[,] . . .
[thus foreseeable] [n]on-cooperation with the physician’s orders will mitigate damages,
but not relieve the physician of responsibility.” FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 296.
90. See, e.g., Hall, 190 P.3d at 863–64 (refusing to hold a physician’s assistant and
pulmonologist liable because they were not involved in the patient’s final discharge).
91. See, e.g., Germaine v. Yu, 854 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (App. Div. 2008) (explaining
that a physician was relieved of responsibility for discharge after transferring care of
the patient to another physician). Although the joint tortfeasor doctrine is designed
to prevent health care providers from avoiding liability when negligence has
occurred and multiple health care providers were involved in the patient’s
treatment, it can be difficult for a patient to prevail under this doctrine. See FURROW
ET AL., supra note 76, at 303 (defining joint tortfeasors as parties whose acts together
cause an injury but remarking that “[a]llocating responsibility among several
tortfeasors is complicated”); Martin B. Adams & Glenn W. Dopf, Selected Topics in
Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 465 PRACTISING L. INST.: LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: LITIG. 55, 116–31 (1993) (discussing liability of initial and
subsequent tortfeasors and the allocation of liability among tortfeasors); S. Y. Tan,
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the Disease?, 9 U. HAW. L.
REV. 241, 259–60 (1987) (“Because of the inequities involved in the application of
joint and several liability, a limitation on the common law doctrine is appropriate.”).
92. Community-based physicians may not have been in contact with their patient
while the patient was hospitalized. Indeed, they may not even be aware of the
hospitalization, particularly if it followed a medical emergency. Arguably, their
responsibility to the patient will not resume until they receive notice that the patient
has been discharged from the hospital and they are once again the patient’s treating
physician. Failure to provide this notice contributes to the frequent absence of
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This relatively complex and resource-dependent task is beyond what
most physicians are equipped, situated, and able to administer.93
Furthermore, even in institutions where such support is currently
provided, physicians typically are not directly involved.94 In addition,
post-discharge assistance is not something physicians have
customarily provided patients, the sine qua non for a successful
medical malpractice suit.95 Thus, patients will find it difficult to
establish that a physician’s failure to monitor constituted a breach of
the standard of care, making a malpractice suit an unlikely vehicle to
promote the delivery of such services or to compensate patients for
associated injuries.
B. Lawsuits Targeting the Discharging Hospital Seeking to Hold It Liable
for the Negligence of Its Agents
Similar problems arise in attempting to hold the treating hospital
liable for post-discharge injury under the available doctrines of
vicarious liability and apparent or ostensible agency.96 The doctrine
of respondeat superior holds a hospital vicariously liable for the acts
or omissions of hospital-employed physicians, nurses, or other staff

continuing care being provided to discharged patients. See supra Parts I–II; see also
Overland, supra note 18 (“Follow-up appointments with patients’ primary care
providers are rarely scheduled, and primary care physicians often never know their
patients were admitted to the hospital.”).
93. Coleman & Berenson, supra note 26, at 533 (noting that clinicians rarely have
sufficient information to monitor or intervene); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 26,
at 1068 (“Practice improvements often fail because they rely on the willingness of
physicians, who are already too busy, to take on additional work.”); Mathews, supra
note 30, at B.1 (asserting that placing the monitoring responsibility on communitybased physicians has the potential to bankrupt many who are already struggling with
their bottom lines).
94. See, e.g., Darkins et al., supra note 18, at 1120 (explaining that the Veterans
Health Administration’s Care Coordination/Home Telehealth model provides care
that is actively coordinated by a cadre of nurses and social workers).
95. John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: The
Physician’s Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 862 (2002) (ascertaining that
physicians’ standard of care is based on what constitutes “customary” practice, which
is “what physicians would customarily or typically do in similar circumstances”); see,
e.g., Gross v. Burt, 149 S.W.3d 213, 227 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a patient’s
visit to the hospital does not necessarily impose a duty on treating physicians to
continue care beyond that stay because “there would be no end to the physicianpatient relationship”).
96. Courts tend to use the phrases “apparent agency” and “ostensible agency”
interchangeably. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 618 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va.
2005) (defining apparent or ostensible agency (agency by estoppel) as “[a]n agency
created by operation of law and established by a principal’s actions that would
reasonably lead a third person to conclude that an agency exists” (citation omitted)).
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members if they negligently injure a patient while acting within the
scope of their employment.97 Nonetheless,
[t]raditionally, the respondeat superior theory does not hold the
hospital liable for the tort, or professional negligence, of an
independent contractor, based upon the reasoning that the
contractor is not subject to the employer’s right to control the
details of the work. Hence, a staff doctor having no more
relationship to the hospital than a staff appointment is solely
responsible for his [or her] personal malpractice or
negligence . . . .”98

Even when it can be established that it was an employee of the
hospital who failed to take adequate steps in conjunction with the
discharge decision, courts have generally not imposed a
corresponding duty to provide post-discharge monitoring.99
Alternatively, the apparent or ostensible agency doctrine holds
that if a patient is led by a hospital’s behavior to justifiably believe
that a physician is acting pursuant to authority specifically delegated
by the hospital, the hospital can be held liable for the actions of its
apparent or ostensible agent, including those of a physician who is
actually an independent contractor.100 Although this doctrine
97. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 983 So. 2d 231, 235–36 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding
that a nurse breached the standard of care by failing to identify the patient’s elevated
blood pressure immediately prior to discharge, communicate this to the treating
physicians, and retake vital signs prior to discharge, and that this breach contributed
to the patient’s death). Historically, hospitals were immune from liability for
medical malpractice that occurred on site. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 374
(describing the traditional relationship of a physician to a hospital as that of an
independent contractor rather than an employee, with the physician the subject of
malpractice liability rather than the hospital). This immunity has eroded as hospitals
have come to play a more active and integral role in the delivery of care. See Arthur
F. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution: Expanding Responsibilities Change Its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 429, 440 n.23 (1973).
98. Southwick, supra note 97, at 440. This rule does not apply when the health
care provider is an employee of the hospital, and hospitals have been held liable
when their employees fail to take adequate steps to prevent the premature discharge
of a patient. See, e.g., Koeniguer v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 602–03 (S.D. 1988)
(ruling summary judgment was improperly granted to a hospital when it was claimed
that the hospital’s nursing staff failed to adequately question a physician’s discharge
of a patient with a high fever).
99. See, e.g., Lewis, 983 So. 2d at 236 (“[I]t is unnecessary to address if [the
hospital-employed nurse] . . . had a continued duty to monitor [the patient’s] blood
pressure/vital signs post discharge.”).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) (“One who represents that
another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to
rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third
person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a
servant or other agent as if he were such.”). In evaluating whether apparent agency
exists, a court must determine whether the hospital’s actions “would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital . . . .” Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp.,
423 N.W.2d 848, 856 (Wis. 1988). These requirements are, at least in some
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provides an avenue for holding a hospital liable for the negligent
acts of health care providers providing services within the hospital101
(such as an independent contractor physician who prematurely
discharges a patient or provides negligent discharge instruction),
physician or staff negligence is often not the primary cause of postdischarge injury.102
C. Lawsuits Targeting the Discharging Hospital Seeking to Hold It Directly
Liable for Failing to Take Adequate Steps to Protect Its Patients from Harm
Hospital corporate liability, a doctrine that has been used
somewhat interchangeably with the inherent function test, the nondelegable duty doctrine, and hospital enterprise liability,103 is a
potentially more comprehensive approach for assigning liability to a
hospital, as it imposes direct duties on hospitals with respect to
patient care that are independent of those that arise out of the
hospital’s relationship with its physicians or staff.104 In the seminal
jurisdictions, becoming easier to satisfy, resulting in an overall expansion of hospital
liability. See, e.g., Ermoian v. Desert Hosp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754, 780 (Ct. App. 2007)
(requiring only that “(1): the service of the physician is performed on what appears
to be the hospital’s premises; (2) a reasonable person in [the] plaintiff’s position
would believe that the physician’s services are part and parcel of [the] services
provided by a hospital; and (3) the hospital does nothing to dispel this belief”); Mejia
v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (Ct. App. 2002)
(“[O]stensible agency is readily inferred.”); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282
(Wis. 1992) (concluding that hospitals can be held liable in malpractice suits under
the doctrine of apparent authority beyond the emergency room context).
101. See Starlett M. Miller & Derek M. Daniels, The Broad Extension of Hospital
Liability, 2 PROF. LIABILITY DEF. Q. 1, 6–7 (2010) (reviewing the application of
vicarious liability under various state laws to a hospital’s independent contractor
physicians and determining that a hospital may be found vicariously liable when its
independent contractors act as agents).
102. See supra notes 87–95 and accompanying text (reviewing the many causes of
patient injury).
103. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987) (recognizing
that the hospital had a “non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent physician care
in its emergency room”); Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (finding that an employee-employer relationship was established when a
radiologist performed a service that was an inherent function of the hospital);
Whittington v. Episcopal Hosp., 44 Pa. D. & C. 4th 449, 455 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2000)
(explaining that the corporate negligence doctrine “creates a nondelegable duty
which the hospital owes directly to the patient”), aff’d, 768 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001); FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 386 (noting that the judicial expansion of the
vicarious liability doctrine has made the medical professionals who use the hospital
part of the “enterprise,” even if they are independent contractors); Philip G. Peters,
Jr., Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability, 73 MO. L. REV. 369, 369 (2008) (asserting
that hospital enterprise liability makes hospitals liable for all injuries occurring in the
hospital regardless of the employment status of the health care provider involved,
and such liability should uniquely improve the quality of hospital care).
104. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 393 (stating that hospitals have evolved
into large institutions, which has expanded their tort liability exposure to vicarious
liability and corporate negligence suits because their abilities to manage institutional
behavior has increased significantly). Indeed, “[t]he non-delegable duty doctrine of
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hospital corporate liability case, Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital,105 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a jury’s
verdict awarding damages to a patient whose leg had to be amputated
after a non-employee physician and hospital-employed nurses failed
to note that a cast applied to the patient’s leg impaired blood flow to
his foot until the leg became gangrenous.106 The court found the
verdict supportable on the grounds that the hospital had negligently
failed to review, supervise, and control the care provided, including
the physician’s work.107 Criticizing the defendant’s contention that
the hospital’s duty to the patient was limited to employing reasonable
care in the selection of the physicians permitted to practice medicine
within its facility and thus did not encompass a duty of continuing
oversight of these physicians,108 the court stated:
“The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact.
Present-day
hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far
more than furnish facilities for treatment . . . . Certainly, the
person who avails himself of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the
hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other
employees will act on their own responsibility.” The Standards for
Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the
defendant’s bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and
other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable and
feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care
of the patient.109

The court’s reasoning in Darling has led a number of courts to
adopt what is generally referred to as the hospital “corporate liability”
doctrine and to recognize the existence of a number of duties that
hospitals owe directly to patients.110 Over the past twenty-five years,
agency law, like the inherent function approach, is an exception to the independent
contractor doctrine. It is typically allowed where the employer has a duty to protect
others and delegates performance to an independent contractor.” Id. at 380.
105. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
106. Id. at 255–56.
107. Id. at 258. The court also found the verdict supportable on grounds that the
hospital negligently failed to employ an adequate number and quality of nurses to
monitor and report the condition of the plaintiff’s injured leg. Id.
108. Id. at 256.
109. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
110. See, e.g., Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (Ariz. 1980) (asserting that a
hospital has a duty to oversee the competence of its staff, including doctors); Elam v.
Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164 (Ct. App. 1982) (agreeing with decisions of
courts in varying jurisdictions on the topic of corporate negligence for hospitals);
Candler Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Purvis, 181 S.E.2d 77, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (explaining
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these non-delegable duties of the hospital have tended to coalesce
into the following:111 “(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the
maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment”;112 “(2) a
duty to select and retain only competent physicians”;113 “(3) a duty to
oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient

that a commercial business transaction is not required for a visitor to a hospital to be
an invitee and thus entitled to pursue a cause of action for negligence on the part of
the hospital); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 411 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907 (App. Div. 1978)
(ruling that even if doctors are not employees of the hospital, a hospital can be liable
for the adverse effects of the doctors’ treatment decisions); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d
391, 395–96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that a hospital may be liable to a
patient under the doctrine of corporate negligence); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591
A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (defining corporate negligence as a “nondelegable duty
which the hospital owes directly to [the] patient”); Douglas v. Freeman, 814 P.2d
1160, 1163–64 (Wash. 1991) (affirming that the duties owed by hospitals to patients
include using reasonable care to maintain buildings and grounds, furnishing patient
supplies and equipment without defects, selecting employees with reasonable care,
and supervising all persons who practice medicine within the hospital); Pedroza v.
Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984) (upholding the adoption of the doctrine of
corporate liability for hospitals). But see Boyd v. Lynch, 493 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Miss.
1986) (concluding that “hospitals are not liable for medical malpractice liability
since a hospital is not a person licensed as a physician”); Strubhart v. Perry Mem’l
Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 275–76 (Okla. 1995) (adopting a limited version of
the doctrine of corporate liability for hospitals); Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328
S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tenn. 2010) (neither rejecting nor accepting the doctrine of
corporate liability); David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability:
Courts’ Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47
VAND. L. REV. 535, 536–37 (1994) (advocating for a limited and clearly defined
application of corporate liability to hospitals in malpractice suits).
111. See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707 (setting out the four general areas of hospital
duties); see also Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening
Judicial Remedies, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 439, 466 (2009) (stating the four general duties of
hospitals as identified in Thompson (citing Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707)).
112. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; see Candler Gen. Hosp., Inc., 181 S.E.2d at 79
(concluding that a worn metal strip on a step that caused a woman to fall constituted
a breach of the hospital’s duty); Pullins v. Fentress Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 663,
670 (Tenn. 1979) (determining that the hospital failed to protect its patients when a
patient was bitten by a brown recluse spider while in her hospital bed).
113. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; see also Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd.
P’ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. 2007) (reviewing other court rulings, concludes that
a hospital has a duty to only hire and extend privileges to medically competent
physicians); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 163–64 (Wisc.
1981) (applying foreseeability rationale to impose a duty to exercise due care in the
hiring of surgeons by a hospital). But see Smith v. Pratt, No. M2008-01540-COA-R9CV, 2009 WL 1086953, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2009) (reiterating that a
hospital is not negligent simply because a negligent act was committed by a physician
permitted to practice at that hospital (citing Edmonds v. Chamberlain Mem’l Hosp.,
629 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981))).
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care”;114 and “(4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate
rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.”115
These duties, at first glance, might appear broad enough to
encompass a duty to exercise due care when discharging patients and
to institute reasonable post-discharge monitoring of patients with
continuing health risks. Certainly, a patient’s need for direction and
assistance does not magically vanish once the patient has left the
hospital’s grounds, particularly in this era of shortened hospital stays
and early discharge.116 Thus, a component of a hospital’s duty to take
steps to ensure the quality of the care provided patients should be to
implement an appropriate discharge plan, provide information about
subsequent risks and what to do if those risks arise, and avoid
discharging patients prematurely.117 However, even here, courts have
limited the application of this responsibility by requiring more than
just proof that negligence occurred in a given case; instead, they have
often mandated a showing of institutional negligence of a “systemic”
nature.118 Moreover, courts appear reluctant to extend the corporate
114. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; see Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 261 (concluding that
a hospital has a duty to instruct and supervise its staff members); Barkes, 328
S.W.3d at 834 (holding that the jury reasonably found that the hospital was
negligent in failing to “implement a system of oversight and enforcement of its
policies”).
115. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; see Wood v. Samaritan Inst., Inc., 161 P.2d 556,
558 (Cal. 1945) (stating that the hospital’s duty to ensure patient care and safety is
established as a matter of implied contract); Barkes, 328 S.W.3d at 835 (holding a
hospital has a responsibility to oversee the activities of its emergency department
through its policies and procedures); O’Quin v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 201 S.W.2d
694, 697 (Tenn. 1947) (declaring that “a hospital is required to exercise such
reasonable care toward a patient as his known condition may require”).
116. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing “systems problems”
associated with discharge).
117. See, e.g., Whittington v. Episcopal Hosp., 44 Pa. D. & C. 4th 449, 455 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. 2000) (applying the corporate negligence doctrine, determined that a
hospital could be held liable when, notwithstanding a diagnosis of preeclampsia, a
pregnant patient was sent home with only a prescription for iron supplements and
was not advised of the risks of preeclampsia despite her documented family history of
preeclampsia), aff’d, 768 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); see also Morrison v.
Washington Cnty., 700 F.2d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that it was “the
manner of discharge which is at issue in this case,” holding that a hospital can be
held liable after transferring a patient who had initially sought treatment at the
hospital for his diabetes but became agitated as a result of delirium tremens and at
the direction of a physician was sent to a local jail without providing the jailer with
any instructions, with the patient dying shortly thereafter, stating that “[w]e cannot
agree that the hospital merely operates as a slavish handmaiden to the whims of
physicians on its staff”); Mason v. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr., No. 05-98-00832-CV,
2001 WL 915215, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 15, 2001) (discussing duties hospitals owe to
patients before discharge), rev’d, 143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004).
118. See Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 652 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Pa. 1995) (stating
that Thompson contemplates systemic negligence, where hospitals allow known
incompetent physicians to practice (citing Thompson, 591 A.2d at 708)); see also id. at
1387–88 (requiring proof of the hospital’s knowledge of premature discharge, or
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negligence doctrine beyond the physical grounds of a hospital,119
demonstrating little willingness to employ this doctrine to recognize a
duty to supply reasonable post-discharge monitoring.120 However,
this leaves discharged patients essentially without a legal remedy for
significant adverse events that could have been readily and reasonably
prevented by an appropriately designed discharge process and postdischarge monitoring, and it provides hospitals with little legal
incentive to supply such programs.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF HOSPITALS
A. Fiduciary Duties in General
Generally speaking, the object of fiduciary law is to protect and
maintain important societal relationships that the “morals of the
market place” would place in jeopardy.121 Although relatively

that its physicians were regularly making bad discharge decisions, for there to be
liability); Mazzarino v. Kushner, 36 Pa. D. & C. 4th 517, 526 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1996)
(“Even if the plaintiff had provided expert medical testimony sufficient to support
her allegations of premature discharge and patient dumping, we would still grant
summary judgment to the defendant . . . because her allegations do not involve
institutional negligence of a systemic nature.”). But see Whittington, 44 Pa. D. & C. 4th
at 459 (explaining that previous cases have rejected a requirement of “systemic”
negligence to establish corporate liability by a hospital (citing Welsh v. Bulger, 698
A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1997))).
119. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987) (limiting the
court’s holding to instances when the patient actually comes to the hospital for
treatment); Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (limiting a hospital’s
liability to physician conduct that occurs during treatment in the hospital and
refusing to extend that liability beyond the hospital premises); Doe v. Garcia, 961
P.2d 1181, 1193 (Idaho 1998) (concluding that any duty owed by a hospital extends
only to activities by hospital employees on the hospital premises). But see Riddle
Mem’l Hosp. v. Dohan, 475 A.2d 1314, 1318 (Pa. 1984) (maintaining that the
hospital could be liable if the jury found it acted unreasonably in discharging the
patient). Arguably, hospital “corporate liability” has been limited to the grounds of
the hospital in part because initially this doctrine was focused on “slip-and-fall” cases
where a patient sustained injury due to improperly maintained premises and in part
because this provides a readily applied boundary on potential hospital liability. See
FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at 382 (“The professional duty of a hospital is to
provide a safe environment for patient diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. If an
unsafe condition of the hospital’s premises causes injury to a patient, as a result of
the hospital’s negligence, the hospital has breached its duty qua hospital.” (citations
omitted)); see also DiTeresi v. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., No. FSTCV065001340S,
2010 WL 5493514, *7–13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010) (addressing a premises’
liability claim against a hospital for an unsafe condition following the sexual assault
of a patient by a staff member).
120. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 983 So. 2d 231, 236 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding it
unnecessary to address whether the hospital had a continuing duty to monitor the
patient after discharge).
121. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that fiduciary
obligations require individuals to remain loyal in a way that morals alone cannot); see
also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289,
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unexplored,122 this doctrine imposes special obligations on those
assuming specific roles in relationships deemed critical for an
ordered and humane society, gives special rights to those to whom
these obligations are owed, and establishes specific legal remedies
when these obligations are not fulfilled.123 In addition to its relatively
lengthy history,124 “[a] hallmark of fiduciary law is its flexibility to
accommodate new situations as they arise,”125 and to redress
situations “where the ordinary laws of contract, tort and unjust
enrichment are silent or insufficient.”126
Relationships recognized as fiduciary in nature tend to be those in
which one party, the beneficiary, is especially vulnerable and
dependent upon another party, the fiduciary, who is expected to
loyally employ specialized knowledge, skills, and power over some
aspect of the beneficiary’s affairs to further the beneficiary’s

1291 (2011) (identifying the importance of trust and truthfulness as the basis for
fiduciary duties).
122. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983) (reporting
that not much has been written on the origins and remedies of fiduciary duties);
Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in
Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (2011) (noting that fiduciary law is
often “characterized as one of the least understood of all legal constructs”).
123. Furrow, supra note 111, at 440–41; see Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M.
Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed”
Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335,
367–68 (2009) (listing the range of relationships encompassed by a fiduciary duty,
including relationships of trust, such as agency relationships).
124. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah Payne Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts:
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty To Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491,
519, n.168 (2009) (noting that the fiduciary duty is rooted in the common law of
trusts); Rotman, supra note 122, at 922 (citing the 1726 English decision of Keech v.
Sandford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223–24, as establishing fiduciary law as part of
the common law).
125. Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 124, at 519; see also Frankel, supra note 121,
at 1290 (describing the accommodating and adjustable nature of fiduciary law in
light of changes in social mores, while still maintaining its core values and norms).
126. Rotman, supra note 122, at 922. At the same time, courts have rejected
fiduciary duty claims brought against health care providers when claimants fail to
identify a duty beyond that already encompassed by a medical malpractice or
informed consent claim. See, e.g., Iacangelo v. Georgetown Univ., 760 F. Supp. 2d 63,
65–66 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty to be
encompassed by its other claims); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 500–01 (Ill. 2000)
(citing examples of cases where courts determined breach of fiduciary duty claims
were duplicative); Hart v. Wright, 16 S.W.3d 872, 877–78 (Tex. App. 2000)
(determining breach of fiduciary duty claim was not factually independent from the
plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim). But see Birriel v. Odeh (In re Odeh), 431
B.R. 807, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (distinguishing the fiduciary claim at issue
as qualitatively different from a medical malpractice claim and noting that the
core of the fiduciary claim alleges that the physician “abused a position of power
and confidence in a manner quite distinct from the quality of the medical
services he rendered”).
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interests.127 Fiduciary law is routinely applied to relationships where
one party is “charged with selflessly acting in the best interests of
another,” including relationships between directors and
corporations, parents and children, and lawyers and their clients.128
Absent a fiduciary obligation, these relationships are ripe for
exploitation by the fiduciary or others, potentially exposing the
beneficiary to great harm and undercutting the purpose that the
relationship was designed to serve.129
As a result, a fiduciary duty is generally construed to be “[a] duty
of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor[,] . . . a duty to
act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another
person and in the best interests of the other person . . . .”130
Because of the trust placed in the fiduciary, the fiduciary is
expected to protect and promote the interests of the beneficiary
even when this may require actions counter to the interests of the
fiduciary.131 In addition, “fiduciaries [generally] have a duty to
disclose to competent beneficiaries any information relevant to
fulfilling their fiduciary obligations.”132

127. See Furrow, supra note 111, at 441–42 (describing a fiduciary as a “super”
agent); see, e.g., Jarvis v. Lieder, 978 A.2d 106, 115 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (pointing to
the unique level of trust and confidence, along with a superior level of knowledge,
skill, or expertise in one party, that characterizes the fiduciary relationship); see also
Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 368 (noting the recognition of
fiduciary duties when one party is entrusted with the welfare of someone who is
relatively vulnerable); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 86, at 1187 (finding that
fiduciaries have specialized knowledge and the ability to deliver needed services not
routinely available); Rotman, supra note 122, at 921 (“[Fiduciary law has been]
applied solely in regard to socially or economically important or necessary
interactions of high trust and confidence creating implicit dependency and peculiar
vulnerability.”).
128. Leonard I. Rotman, Is Fiduciary Law Efficient? A Preliminary Analysis 7
(Oct. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485853; see also Frankel, supra note 122, at 795 (“Fiduciaries
appear in a variety of forms, including agents, partners, directors and officers,
trustees, executors and administrators, receivers, bailees, and guardians.”);
Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 367–68 (ascertaining fiduciary
relationships cover a broad range of relationships).
129. See Frankel, supra note 121, at 1293–94 (cautioning that entrustment poses
the serious and potentially harmful risks that fiduciaries will misuse entrusted
property and power, not possess their claimed expertise, or not exercise their
expertise well or at all).
130. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
131. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 368; Hafemeister & Spinos,
supra note 86, at 1187; Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB
Liability, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 393 (2005).
132. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 86, at 1188.
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B. The Fiduciary Duties of Physicians
It is now widely asserted that fiduciary law also encompasses the
relationships between physicians and their patients.133 As early as
1956, a California Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he doctorpatient relationship is a fiduciary one,”134 and many courts have
recognized over the years that physicians owe a fiduciary duty to their
patients because of the “intrinsic nature” of the physician-patient
relationship.135
This fiduciary obligation stems from patients’
dependency on their physicians for medical treatment, physicians’
superior medical expertise, and the trust society and patient impart
to their physicians.136 A related justification for imposing a fiduciary
duty on physicians is that patients are not trained to diagnose their
own medical conditions, so they must rely on their doctors for
medical treatment.137
A claim for a breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty to a patient will
generally sound in tort,138 with four required elements: “(1) the
existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) damages
133. See, e.g., Andrew Grubb, The Doctor as Fiduciary, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 311,
311 (1994) (describing physicians’ fiduciary relationship with their patients);
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 124, at 520 (noting that a fiduciary relationship
exists between a physician and patient that places certain obligations on the
physician); Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 369–86 (explaining the
history of the fiduciary relationship between doctors and patients and noting that
many courts have recognized this relationship); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 86,
at 1188–92 (discussing the legal precedent underlying the fiduciary relationship
between a doctor and patient, including the duty of informed consent and duty to
disclose emergent medical risks); Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers,
29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 337 (2008) (“This concept of the physician as
fiduciary has become well accepted in both U.S. law and the ethical tenets of
American professional medical associations.”).
134. Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); see also
Groendal v. Westrate, 137 N.W. 87, 88 (Mich. 1912) (noting patients’ reliance on
their physicians); Schmucking v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633, 633 (Minn. 1931) (recognizing
a fiduciary relationship between a physician and patient due to patients’ dependence
on physicians); Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 369 n.171 (citing
precedents explicitly recognizing a fiduciary duty owed by a physician to a patient).
135. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 369; see, e.g., Birriel v. Odeh
(In re Odeh), 431 B.R. 807, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding a fiduciary
relationship between a patient and his or her doctor); Gonzales v. Palo Verde Mental
Health Servs., 783 P.2d 833, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same); DiTeresi v. Stamford
Health Sys., Inc., No. FSTCV065001340S, 2010 WL 5493514, at *31 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 14, 2010) (same); Hart v. Wright, 16 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. App. 2000)
(acknowledging that “a fiduciary relationship might exist between a physician and
patient in special circumstances”).
136. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 369–70.
137. See Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 86, at 1186 (describing physicians as the
“gatekeepers” to treatment because they possess critical information).
138. See Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 375 (ascertaining that a
breach of a fiduciary duty is usually viewed as a tort). But see id. at 375 n.197 (noting
that a breach of fiduciary duty may constitute a contractual violation because a
fiduciary breach violates the parties’ expectations).
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(harm) incurred by the person to whom that duty was owed, and (4)
a causal link between the breach and the resulting harm.”139 Among
the fiduciary duties physicians owe patients are obligations to keep
medical information and records confidential and private, to not
engage in a sexual relationship with a current patient, to exercise
independent medical judgment during the course of the physicianpatient relationship, to avoid conflicts of interests that may
compromise medical judgment, and to disclose to a patient adverse
medical conditions of which the patient is unaware.140 Fiduciary
duties benefit patients and society as a whole because they both
induce better medical judgment and empower physicians “to fully
exercise their training and skills and . . . minimize financial incentives
that might otherwise lead them to diminish and perhaps even
abdicate their role in medical decision making.”141
C. The Evolving Nature and Role of Hospitals
Although this Article takes the position that it is now appropriate
to view the hospital-patient relationship as also possessing fiduciary
characteristics, it should be noted that fiduciary obligations have not
historically attached to this relationship.142 Indeed, hospitals were
139. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 375; see Neade v. Portes, 739
N.E.2d 496, 502 (Ill. 2000) (“[T]o state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, it must
be alleged that a fiduciary duty exists, that the fiduciary duty was breached, and that
such breach proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff complains”);
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 124, at 521–25 (providing a detailed discussion of
each element needed to prove a breach of fiduciary duty); see also Birriel, 431 B.R. at
812 (“[I]llinois law requires . . . existence of the duty, breach, and resulting damages
[for a breach of fiduciary duty claim] . . . .”).
140. See Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 124, at 527 (listing obligations a physician
owes to patients, including a duty of good faith); Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra
note 123, at 375–76 & n.200 (including obligations to abstain from engaging in
sexual relations with patients and avoid conflicts of interests as part of a doctor’s
fiduciary duty to her patients); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 86, at 1189–92
(discussing cases that held a doctor’s fiduciary duty included the obligation to
inform a patient of adverse medical conditions, a duty that may extend beyond the
termination of the doctor-patient relationship and may not require a patient to
inquire about the condition to trigger the doctor’s duty).
141. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 123, at 381.
142. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990)
(rejecting claim that medical center had a fiduciary relationship with a patient but
recognizing the patient’s claim against his physician); see also Harrison v. Christus St.
Patrick Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. La. 2006) (“No authority exists to
support the plaintiff’s contention that the healthcare provider/patient contract
creates a fiduciary duty.”); Gonzales v. Palo Verde Mental Health Servs., 783 P.2d
833, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“We find no logic in her contention that because a
doctor owes a patient a fiduciary duty and because a hospital is subject to the same
standard of care in a malpractice action as a doctor, the hospital, therefore, owes a
patient a fiduciary duty.” (citation omitted)); Cotton v. Fountain Valley Reg’l Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., No. G044285, 2011 WL 332011, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2011)
(holding that the hospital did not owe a fiduciary duty to the patient); Sherwood v.
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traditionally thought to owe few, if any, duties to their patients
because they were considered to be little more than a physical
structure and a set of tools for physicians to employ when treating
their patients.143 Most early American hospitals arose from public
almshouses in the 1800s and, as government institutions, sovereign
immunity protected these early hospitals from being held legally
accountable for the care provided to patients.144 Similarly, the
immunity doctrine protected the few privately funded and operated
charitable, non-profit hospitals from liability.145 Society was deemed
to benefit from this charitable care, and courts generally viewed
hospitals as immune from liability for any negligence occurring on
their grounds, including negligent acts by physicians.146 For many
years, charity patients comprised the majority of the individuals
Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 797 (Conn. 2006) (“The plaintiff has provided scant
reason to conclude that a hospital owes a patient the duty of a fiduciary.”); DiTeresi
v. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., No. FSTCV065001340S, 2010 WL 5493514, at *31
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010) (noting that Connecticut trial courts have found no
fiduciary relationship between a hospital and its patient). But see DiTeresi, 2010 WL
5493514, at *31 (refusing to recognize a bright line rule as to what constitutes a
fiduciary relationship and emphasizing that the existence of a fiduciary duty requires
a case-by-case inquiry). However, until relatively recently physicians were also not
considered to owe fiduciary duties to their patients, a position that has largely been
reversed. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395 (N.C. App. 1980) (“Prior to
modern times, a hospital undertook only to furnish room, food, facilities for
operation, and attendants . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v.
Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1991) (recognizing that hospitals used to serve
as “charitable organizations,” but have evolved to play a more comprehensive role);
see also JAMES WALKER SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY § 3.02[1], at 3-7 (2005) (“[H]ospitals
merely provided the facilities for the physicians to use.”); I. Trotter Hardy, Jr., When
Doctrines Collide: Corporate Negligence and Respondeat Superior When Hospital Employees
Fail To Speak Up, 61 TUL. L. REV. 85, 87 (1986) (noting the previously prevailing
judicial attitude that hospitals did not owe a duty to patients because hospitals did
not themselves treat patients but instead only provided a convenient facility for
physicians and patients); Southwick, supra note 97, at 434 (explaining that the
hospital’s role was traditionally nothing more than supplying a building with space to
support physicians conducting their work).
144. LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, DELIVERING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH 291 (2008).
145. See John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A
Call for Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 7–8
(2004) (discussing the origin of hospitals’ immunities as related to governmental and
charitable immunity, which sought to protect the assets of hospitals as governmental
entities and non-profits, respectively).
146. See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 706 (recognizing that the doctrine of charitable
immunity previously shielded hospitals from tort liability (citing McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 432 (1876), overruled by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.
407, 408 (1969))); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 622
(1998) (discussing different cases that reasoned charitable immunity was based on
the premise that a hospital should be protected from liability so that it can continue
its charitable work); Note, Theories for Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals for Medical
Malpractice: Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 561,
563–64 (1985).
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receiving care in hospitals, as more affluent individuals received their
medical care in their own homes.147
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, scientific and
technological advances, such as the germ theory of disease,
anesthesia, and diagnostic imaging, altered the practice of medicine
significantly.
This attracted wealthy patients to hospitals for
treatments and procedures that physicians could not readily perform
in the patients’ homes.148 With this influx of patients who could pay
for their own medical treatment, hospitals were no longer limited to
a charitable model and became capable of generating profit.149 By
the 1940s, it was clear that hospitals were shifting from a charitable
model to a business-like model, serving and billing virtually all
segments of society and offering an increasingly wide range of
medical services to patients.150 Based on this emerging view that
hospitals are comprehensive health care providers, courts in the midtwentieth century began to withdraw the immunity previously
afforded to hospitals151 and hold them liable for employee negligence
under the doctrine of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.152
As discussed, hospitals’ liability expanded and now encompasses
the doctrines of apparent or ostensible agency153 and hospital
corporate liability.154 This expansion has continued with a pair of
more recent events: the Institute of Medicine’s issuing To Err Is
147. SHI & SINGH, supra note 144, at 291.
148. Id. at 292–93.
149. Id. at 293.
150. Id.
151. The charitable immunity doctrine was in decline by the 1940s, and today it no
longer protects hospitals from suit. See Bradley C. Cannon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of
Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
969, 972–73 (1979) (pinpointing 1942 as the year marking the charitable immunity
doctrine’s decline); Jerold Oshinsky & Gheiza M. Diaz, Liability of Not-for-Profit
Organizations and Insurance Coverage for Related Liability, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Mar.
2002, at 1, 1–2, available at www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol4iss2_3/art_3.htm
(noting that in the 1940s both state courts and state legislatures began to allow patients
to recover damages from hospitals); see, e.g., Univ. of Va. Health Servs. Found. v. Morris,
657 S.E.2d 512, 522 (Va. 2008) (holding hospital was not entitled to charitable
immunity because it operated like a commercial entity); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem’l
Hosp., 260 P.2d 765, 765 (Wash. 1953) (abrogating the charitable immunity doctrine).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 219 (2012) (“An employer is subject to
vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of
employment.”). Prior to 1957, hospitals were excepted from the application of this
doctrine because they were not considered capable of controlling the medical
decisions of their staff. The New York State Court of Appeals’ rejection of this
exception in Bing v. Thunig in 1957 was ultimately accepted around the country. See
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.S.2d 3, 12 (1957) (abandoning the doctrine of hospital
immunity for the negligence of a hospital-employed nurse); see also SMITH, supra note
143, § 3.02[1], at 3-6 to 3-8; see also supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text.
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Human in 2000,155 a report which focused national attention on the
high level of medical errors occurring within the healthcare system
and the need to systematically improve the quality and delivery of this
care,156 and Congress’s enacting the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in 2010,157 which introduced significant
structural changes to the delivery of health care in this country.158
This evolution will likely continue, driven by additional changes that
will enhance the perception that hospitals have become a big
business that should carry its own freight.159 These changes include:
(1) the massive amount spent on hospital care, $851 billion in
2011,160
155. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Although this report, with its emphasis on dysfunctional
health care delivery “systems,” has tended to be the central focus of efforts to
improve health care quality, the issuance of the report was preceded and followed by
a number of influential accounts. See generally HUMAN ERROR IN MEDICINE (Marilyn
Sue Bogner, ed., 1994); ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN
IMPERFECT SCIENCE (2002); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT
(1984); WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 1; Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272
JAMA 1851 (1994).
156. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform
Act of 2010 and Medical Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in the
Night?, 64 SMU L. REV. 735, 739 (2011) (discussing the impact the report had on
efforts to improve the care patients receive). See generally INST. OF MED., supra note
155.
157. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3025, 124
Stat. 119, 408 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (Supp. V
2011)).
158. See David W. Hilgers & Sidney S. Welch, Physicians Post-PPACA: Not Going Bust
at the Healthcare Buffet, 24 HEALTH LAW. 1, 1, 4 (2012) (discussing the structural
impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, including driving the
healthcare industry in general and physicians in particular to a more integrated
model for the delivery of medical services); Julie E. Kass & John S. Linehan, Fostering
Healthcare Reform Through a Bifurcated Model of Fraud and Abuse Regulation, 5 J. HEALTH
& LIFE SCI. L. 75, 101–08, 119–22 (2012) (arguing that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act enhances the success and sustainability of integrated delivery
models); Pear, supra note 2, at A12 (reporting that these structural changes include
coordinating care and fixed-fee pricing for bundled services). See generally Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025 (promoting a reformation of the existing
healthcare model).
159. See Interview by Kai Ryssdal with Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, Bioethicist, Univ. of
Penn. (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/
health-care/health-care-constant-work-progress (interviewing the former White
House health policy adviser, who stated that health care “is a $2.8 trillion part of the
American economy”).
160. National Health Expenditures 2011 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013) (“U.S. health care spending reached $2.7 trillion in 2011, or $8,680
per person.”); see also Young, supra note 8 (noting that hospital costs increased to
$814 billion in 2010). Compare David Meltzer & Chad Whelan, The Economics of
Hospital Medicine, in HOSPITAL MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 11, 11 (reporting that
hospital care is expensive, with the U.S. spending $512 billion on hospital care in
2003), with Harold Brubaker, Hospitals Embrace Proton-Beam Therapy: The High-tech
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(2) pervasive hospital marketing campaigns encouraging patients
to view hospitals as their all-purpose care provider,161
(3) the high levels of adverse events attributable to
hospitalization;162
Cancer Treatment Has Not Been Proven Superior to Cheaper Alternatives, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Apr. 29, 2012, at C1 (discussing the fact that nonprofit hospitals and private investors
have spent large sums of money on high-tech cancer treatments before it has been
established that they work better than cheaper methods).
161. See Furrow, supra note 111, at 459–60 (arguing that hospitals have become big
businesses that spend millions on marketing campaigns resulting in the public
expecting a wide range of health services from them); infra note 225 (discussing
direct mailings by hospitals as part of their advertising efforts).
162. See DANIEL R. LEVINSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVERSE
EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at i-iii
(2010) (estimating that one in seven Medicare beneficiaries experience an adverse
event while hospitalized and an additional 13.5% experience an event that causes
temporary harm, with 44% of these events considered preventable, resulting in costs
of $4.4 billion per year); DANIEL R. LEVINSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM, at ii
(Jan. 2012) (“Hospital staff did not report 86 percent of events to incident reporting
systems . . . .”); NPR, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH, POLL: SICK IN AMERICA 4 (2012), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/
farm/reports/surveys_and_polls/2012/rwjf72962 (“About one in ten hospitalized
Americans report getting the wrong diagnosis, treatment or test (11%), and one in twelve
hospitalized Americans report getting an infection in the hospital (8%).”); David C.
Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows That Adverse Events in Hospitals May Be Ten
Times Greater Than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 581, 584, 586 (2011)
(finding adverse events occurred in 33.2% of hospital admissions and concluding the
true rates are likely higher still because the methods commonly used to measure safety
fail to detect more than 90% of the adverse events); Stephanie Rennke & Margaret C.
Fang, Hazards of Hospitalization: More Than Just “Never Events”, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1653, 1653 (2011) (listing specific adverse events, including medication errors
and hospital acquired anemia); Richard P. Wenzel & Michael B. Edmond, The Impact of
Hospital-Acquired Bloodstream Infections, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 174, 174 (2001)
(reporting healthcare-associated infections are estimated to occur in 5% of all U.S.
hospitalizations, approaching 10% in larger institutions, representing 1.75–3.5 million
infections per year, with a “crude” mortality rate of 27% for hospital-acquired
bloodstream infections); see also Janet Lavelle, UCSD, Kaiser Hospitals Fined for Errors, U-T
SAN DIEGO NEWS (June 1, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news
/2012/jun/01/ucsd-kaiser-hospitals-fined-errors/?print&page=all (“Since 2007, state law
has required hospitals to report any errors from a list of potentially deadly ‘adverse
events’ . . . . Since the law went into effect, the state has issued 224 administrative
penalties against 129 California hospitals . . . .”).
A number of entities have begun to issue “report cards” assessing hospitals’
performance, with many hospitals receiving “poor” grades. See How Safe Is Your Hospital?,
LEAPFROG GRP. (June 6, 2012), http://www.leapfroggroup.org/policy_leadership/leap
frog_news/4894464 (“The Hospital Safety Score is calculated using publicly available data
on patient injuries, medical and medication errors, and infections. . . . Of the 2,652
general hospitals issued a Hospital Safety Score, 729 earned an ‘A,’ 679 earned a ‘B,’ and
1243 earned a ‘C’ or below.”); see also Best Hospitals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (ranking hospitals,
categorized by specialty, thereby comparing 5000 hospitals); Hospital Compare,
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(providing users the ability to perform a geographic search and compare hospitals).
Hospital organizations, however, have criticized these rankings for employing flawed
measures that “do not accurately portray a picture of the safety efforts made by hospitals.”
Cheryl Clark, Leapfrog Issues Hospital Safety Report Cards, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (June 6,
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(4) hospitals’ growing emphasis on increasing revenue and
decreasing costs,163 an emphasis predominant within nonprofit
hospitals as well;164
(5) a surge in mergers and acquisitions,165 with hospitals
announcing eighty-six merger and acquisition deals valued at $7.9
billion in 2011, the most in a decade,166 which triggered government
actions challenging them as prohibited monopolies and illegal
restraints on competition in local markets,167 as well as raising
2012),
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/TEC-280925/Leapfrog-IssuesHospital-Safety-Report-Cards; see also Ashwini R. Sehgal, The Role of Reputation in U.S. News
& World Report’s Rankings of the Top 50 American Hospitals, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
521, 523–24 (2010) (researching the effect of a hospital’s reputation on its U.S.
News & World Report’s ranking and concluding that hospitals’ standings largely
reflect their subjective reputations).
163. See Meltzer & Whelan, supra note 42, at 13 (calling the pressure to increase
profits “ubiquitous”).
164. See id. (explaining that all hospitals need to increase revenue because profits
are used to attain various institutional goals); Lisa Goldstein & John C. Nelson, Hospital
Revenues in Critical Condition; Downgrades May Follow: Not-for-Profit Hospital Revenue
Growth Lowest in Two Decades, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV.: U.S. PUB. FIN., Aug. 10, 2011, at
1, available at www.hhnmag.com/hhnmag/PDFs/2011PDFs/moodys.pdf.
165. See Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep
Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973,
975–76 (2012) (noting the growing number of mergers and acquisitions to form large
multihospital health care systems and decrease competition); Steve Adams, Empire Builder;
Newcomer Steward Health Care Is the Driving Force Behind a Surge in Local Hospital Merger Talks,
PATRIOT LEDGER, Apr. 28, 2012, at B19 (“A wave of acquisitions is reshaping ownership of
Massachusetts hospitals . . . .”); Julie Appleby, As They Consolidate, Hospitals Get Pricier,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2010/
september/26/hospital-mergers-costs.aspx (finding that increasing health care prices are
due, in part, to many hospitals’ mergers); Sarah Kliff, What Happens When Hospitals
Consolidate, WONKBLOG (Mar. 8, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/ezra-klein/post/what-happens-when-hospitals-consolidate/2012/03/08/gIQAnE
dFzR_blog.html (concluding that some hospitals consolidated to weather the economic
downturn); Julian Pecquet, Hospital Consolidation Hearing Sparks Debate on Healthcare Law’s
Merits, HEALTHWATCH (Sept. 9, 2011, 02:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch
/health-reform-implementation/180663-consolidation-hearing-sparks-debate-on-whetherhealth-law-hurts-or-helps (reporting on a congressional hearing to address the rising cost
of health care resulting from an increasing trend of hospital mergers); Avik Roy, Hospital
Monopolies: The Biggest Driver of Health Costs That Nobody Talks About, FORBES (Aug. 22,
2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/08/22/hospital-monopoliesthe-biggest-driver-of-health-costs-that-nobody-talks-about (calling hospital monopolies the
most “predatory force” in the healthcare system).
166. Brent Kendall, Regulators Seek to Cool Hospital-Deal Fever: Washington Steps Up
Merger Challenges, but Firms Say Campaign Ignores Economic Reality of Health-Care Overhaul,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2012, at B10; Dave Michaels, Ruling on Health Care Law Won’t Slow
Down Growing Consolidations of Texas Hospitals, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 27, 2012,
09:39 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/health-care/20120627-ruling-onhealth-care-law-won-t-slow-down-growing-consolidations-of-texas-hospitals.ece.
167. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2011)
(agreeing to address a challenge by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to a hospital
acquisition in Georgia that the FTC contended would have created a monopoly), rev’d,
2013 WL 598434 (Feb. 19, 2013); Colon Health Ctrs. v. Hazel, No. 1:12cv615, 2012 WL
4105063, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2012) (addressing a filing by two medical groups
from Delaware and Maryland alleging that Virginia law, which requires out-of-state
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concerns about lost tax revenue because of the tax exemptions
hospitals may enjoy168 and increased healthcare costs in general;169
(6) hospitals’ geographically targeted expansion of services to
“capture” well-insured patients, which encompasses building
freestanding outpatient medical centers and hospitals close to their
competitors;170
(7) hospitals’ increasing size, wealth, and clout,171 with nearly
67% undertaking renovations or additional construction172 and
smaller hospitals being squeezed out;173
providers to obtain a certificate demonstrating a need for their services within the state,
violates the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution); Karen Cheung-Larivee, Public Hospital Sales to Face More Scrutiny,
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/publichospital-sales-face-more-scrutiny/2012-04-10 (discussing a Florida law that requires the
state’s healthcare oversight agency to review hospital sales); see also Eric Morath,
Corporate News: Hospitals Drop Plan for Merger, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2012, at B5
(reporting that two Illinois hospitals abandoned plans to merge because of pressure
from federal regulators who claimed the merger would create a local monopoly—a
decision that marks a new push by the FTC to block health-care consolidation). But see
Berenson et al., supra note 165, at 978 (“Our findings did not suggest that more
aggressive antitrust enforcement . . . would successfully restrain provider pricing power
more generally.”).
168. See Don Lee, Healthcare Jobs Drive a Revival in Pittsburgh, L.A. TIMES, May 13,
2012, at A1 (discussing official reports that exemptions for nonprofit hospitals cost
Allegheny County, which includes Pittsburgh, tens of millions of dollars in tax
revenues and reporting that several states are considering changing tax exemptions
for non-profits in light of lost revenue).
169. See Alicia Caramenico, Healthcare Consolidation to Cause Massive Inflation,
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/healthcareconsolidation-cause-massive-inflation/2013-01-16 (“Adding to healthcare consolidation
worries, mergers and acquisitions among hospitals, health systems and physician practices
are producing a spike in inflation . . . . That’s because with healthcare consolidation
comes strong pricing power . . . . [H]ospitals are increasingly acquiring practices and
converting them to outpatient entities or outpatient hospital departments to reap bigger
payments from both Medicare and private insurers.”).
170. See Emily R. Carrier et al., Hospitals’ Geographic Expansion in Quest of Well-Insured
Patients: Will the Outcome Be Better Care, More Cost, or Both?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 827, 827
(2012) (noting a shift to expanding into different geographical locations that have a
dense population of well-insured clients); Jordan Rau, Recession Boosted Hospital
Expansions Into Affluent Areas, Study Finds, CAPSULES: THE KHN BLOG (Apr. 9, 2012, 4:01
PM),
http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2012/04/hospitals-invadingaffluent-neighborhoods-in-search-of-patients-study-says/ (discussing studies that show
hospitals are more aggressively seeking clients by moving facilities into areas with dense
populations of well-insured patients, although some areas are already well-served by
competitors).
171. See Berenson et al., supra note 165, at 973 (concluding that hospitals’ increased
negotiating power is a result of the leverage provided by mergers); Lee, supra note 168,
at A1 (noting growth in healthcare jobs across the country as “[h]ealthcare firms now
dominate the rankings of major employers in large cities as well as rural communities”
and “[h]ealthcare has fueled job growth for a generation”); Margot Sanger-Katz,
Hospitals Using New Strategies to Lock in High Prices, NAT’L J., May 7, 2012, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/hospitals-using-new-strategies-to-lock-inhigh-prices-20120507 (stating hospitals are focusing on mergers as a means of growth);
Paul Barr, Taking a Different Path: Annual M&A Report Shows Year of Strong Growth, Rise of
Nontraditional Deals, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM (Jan. 26, 2012, 12:01 AM),
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(8) the high compensation levels received by hospital
administrators and executives,174 with special attention given to this

http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130126/MAGAZINE/301269951
(stating that the number of hospital deals climbed “more than 18% to 109 in 2012, up
from 92 deals recorded for 2011”); Matt Dobias, Study: Bigger Hospitals Drive Cost
Increases, POLITICO (May 7, 2012, 10:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/05
12/76016.html (discussing the increasing size of hospitals and its impact on health care
payments); Gilbert M. Gaul, Growing Size and Wealth of Children’s Hospitals Fueling
Questions About Spending, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealth
news.org/stories/2011/September/26/childrens-hospitals-part-one.aspx (identifying a
new $400 million children’s hospital as exemplifying a national trend of increasing the
size of hospitals); Michaels, supra note 166 (reporting the increase in hospital mergers
both nationally and in Texas, with 86 hospital mergers nationwide in 2011, which is the
most in a decade); Ken Terry, The Hospital Construction Boom: Brought to You by
Healthcare Reform, CBS MONEYWATCH (Jan. 25, 2011, 5:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com
/8301-505123_162-43842393/the-hospital-construction-boom-brought-to-you-by-healthcare
-reform/ (addressing a survey finding 67% of hospitals involved in some type of
construction).
172. See Terry, supra note 171 (reporting that a large number of hospitals are
expanding); see also Gaul, supra note 171 (“[T]he surge in spending is also helping to
fuel a multibillion-dollar building boom as hospitals add towers and beds.”).
173. See Lisa Chedekel, Smaller Connecticut Hospitals Struggle with Deficits, HARTFORD
COURANT (Apr. 17, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-17/health/hc-hospitalfinances-20120417_1_smaller-hospitals-connecticut-hospitals-hospital-tax (concluding that
smaller hospitals’ limited resources make them less flexible and more susceptible to
financial challenges); see also Lee, supra note 168, at A1 (explaining that health firms
across the country are merging with and buying smaller health enterprises to grow); Rich
Lord, West Penn Allegheny Files Amended Lawsuit Against UPMC, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(Apr. 25, 2012, 12:42 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/
west-penn-allegheny-files-amended-lawsuit-against-upmc-632911/?print=1 (describing a
hospital’s alleged use of “predatory tactics” against competitors).
174. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HOSPITAL STUDY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINAL REPORT 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/execsum_hospprojrept.pdf (reporting that an IRS study of nonprofit hospitals
found: “[t]he average and median total compensation amounts reported as paid to the
top management official by respondents to the questionnaire were $490,000 and
$377,000, respectively”); Scott Thurm, CEO Pay Moves with Corporate Results, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 2012, at A1 (finding executive pay in healthcare industry increased more than any
other sector in 2011); Isabel Vincent & Melissa Klein, Rich CEOs Performing Cashectomy on
Hosps, N.Y. POST, Nov. 27, 2011, at 8 (noting that the compensation of some CEOs of
nonprofit medical centers included bonuses of over a million dollars, huge retirement
payments, upgraded flights, housing stipends, and chauffeurs)David Brooks & Kevin
Landrigan, Report: Hospitals’ CEO Pay Rose Sharply in Recent Years, NASHUA TELE. (July 3,
2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/966499-196/report-hospitals-ceo-pay-rose
-sharply-in.html (juxtaposing rising hospital CEO pay with a diminishing economy);
Gaul, supra note 171 (“In 2009, most CEOs at the nation’s largest children’s hospitals
were paid $1 million or more. . . . Many of the executives [also] received hefty
bonuses, country club memberships, cars or other perks.”); Cathey O’Donnell & Jane
Lerner, Business of Medicine, Part 2: Eight Local Hospital Officials Got $1M in 2010, J. NEWS
(Feb. 12, 2012, 12:54 AM), http://www.lohud.com/article/20120212/NEWS02/30212
0060/Business-Medicine-Part-2-Eight-local-hospital-officials-got-1M-2010 (focusing on
healthcare CEOs earning over a million dollars a year in compensation); Ben Sutherly
& Chelsey Levingston, Some Health CEOs Earned Millions, MIDDLETOWN J. (Dec. 12,
2011, 2:27 AM), http://www.middletownjournal.com/news/news/local/somehealth-ceos-earned-millions-1/nNK4W/ (“Seven executives at local nonprofit
hospitals and their parent networks each collected $1 million or more in 2009.”).
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compensation when their relatively small community hospitals enter
into bankruptcy;175
(9) concerns over whether hospitals are providing appropriate
levels of charity care, including failing to extend debt forgiveness to
patients unable to pay their medical bills and applying undue or
inappropriate pressure to collect these bills;176
175. See Erin L. Nissley, Marian Leaving $19M hole, TIMES-TRIBUNE, Dec. 5, 2011, at
A7 (questioning the high salaries paid to hospital administrators and trustees at a
bankrupt community hospital). An Executive Order was recently issued in New York
that caps the amount of “State financial assistance or State-authorized payments” that
may be used to pay executive officers of “for-profit entities that provide critical
services to New Yorkers in need.” See GOV. ANDREW M. CUOMO, EXEC. ORDER NO. 38,
LIMITS ON STATE-FUNDED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Jan. 18,
2012), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/executiveorder/38; see also SUSAN F.
ZINDER, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASSOC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: NEW LIMITS ON COMPENSATION
PAID TO EXECUTIVES OF STATE SERVICE PROVIDERS 1–2 (2012) (summarizing Cuomo’s
executive order and examining its impact).
176. See, e.g., New Colorado Law Sets Limits on Hospital Charges for Patients Eligible for
Financial Aid, 21 HEALTH L. RPT. 685 (2012) (reporting on a Colorado bill that
requires hospitals to charge people who are eligible for financial aid the hospital’s
lowest negotiated rate); Amanda W. Thai, Note, Is Senator Grassley Our Savior?: The
Crusade Against “Charitable” Hospitals Attacking Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOWA L. REV.
761, 764, 770–72 (2011) (discussing the debt-collection and bad-debt problem, and
analyzing Senator Grassley’s additions to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, which requires non-profits to meet stricter standards to earn tax exempt status);
Ames Alexander & David Raynor, Hospital Suits Force New Pain on Patients, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/04/23/319350
9/hospital-suits-force-new-pain.html (investigating non-profit hospitals use of law
suits to collect unpaid accounts from patients); Gaul, supra note 171 (finding one
large hospital provided little free care despite having an investment portfolio valued
at $21 billion); Jenny Gold, Sued Over an $1,800 Hospital Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/april/27/charity-carenonprofit-hospitals-patient-debt.aspx (recounting the story of a local Catholic hospital’s
use of a collection agency to coerce payment from a low-income patient); Bertrand M.
Gutierrez, Nonprofit Exemptions for Hospitals Worry Local Leaders Facing Tax Increases,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (May 27, 2012, 12:20 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local
/article_fd2f7a77-81ad-5a55-ab16-730e2e431c6e.html (“[L]ocal and state government
leaders are questioning the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals and calling on
them to contribute more toward the cost of government services.”); Carla K.
Johnson, Illinois Bill Would Require Free Care for Poor, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May
29, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-05-29/illinois-bill-would-requirefree-care-for-poor (discussing an Illinois bill that would require hospitals to see
patients that are 125% or more below the federal poverty line free of charge); M.B.
Pell, Charity-care Hospital Regulations Scrutinized: State’s Tax-exemption Rules Aren’t Well
Defined, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 7, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news
/news/local/charity-care-hospital-regulations-scrutinized/nQKQd/ (“[W]ith tax
revenues shrinking and the cost of public health care rising, policy makers across the
country are starting to require not-for-profit hospitals to provide more evidence of
tangible community benefits.”); James Ritchie, For Cincinnati Hospitals, Charity Care
Levels Come Under Scrutiny, BUSINESS COURIER (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/print-edition/2012/01/20/for-cincinnatihospitals-charity-care.html (questioning whether hospitals provided enough charity
care to warrant their tax exempt status); Ron Shinkman, Hospitals Spend Little on
Charitable Care, Yet Evade Taxes, FIERCEHEALTHFINANCE (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/hospitals-spend-little-charitable-care-yet-evade
-taxes/2011-10-18 (“Many Iowa [non-for-profit] hospitals spend far less than 1 percent
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(10) concerns over whether hospitals engage in improper billing,
referral, and compensation practices,177 as well as admission practices
designed to evade new Medicare rules that penalize hospitals for
of their revenues on care for poor patients while reaping tax exemptions [of $58
million a year] on nearly $2 billion worth of property.”); Ron Shinkman, IRS Proposes
New Rules to Govern Charity Care, FIERCEHEALTHFINANCE (June 26, 2012),
http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/irs-proposes-new-rules-govern-charity-care/
2012-06-26 (issuing proposed regulations regarding what constitutes requisite charity
care at not-for-profit hospitals, the IRS “would specifically rule out gross charges for
uninsured patients and would require hospitals to charge no more than they would an
insured patient”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debt Collector Is Faulted for Tough Tactics in
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/business
/debt-collector-is-faulted-for-tough-tactics-in-hospitals.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(listing types of aggressive collection tactics hospitals utilize, including demanding
payment before providing treatment and employing debt collectors to sit in hospital
lobbies); Elizabeth Stawicki, Debt Collectors in the ER, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 1, 2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/June/01/minnesota-ER-al-franken.aspx
(describing testimony at a U.S. Senate hearing from patients who were pressured to pay
for their care up front while awaiting emergency room treatment); Karen Garloch, Perdue
Wants Hospitals To Publicize Charity Care Policies, Make Bills Understandable, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (May 14, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/05/14/3238250/
perdue-wants-hospitals-to-publicize.html (discussing North Carolina Governor Bev
Perdue’s efforts to require hospitals to be more transparent about financial assistance
programs).
177. See Hilgers & Welch, supra note 158, at 10 (pointing out that the hospitalphysician employment model does not eliminate the potential for fraud and abuse);
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dallas-Based Tenet Healthcare Pays More Than
$42 Million to Settle Allegations of Improperly Billing Medicare: Settlement Related
to Company’s Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities (Apr. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-civ-446.html (reporting that the
Justice Department has recovered more than $6.6 billion in False Claims Act cases
involving fraud against federal health care programs since January 2009); Hospital
Charges Show Huge Variance in Study, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/news/articles/2012/04/24/hospital-charges
-show-huge-variance-in-study (noting a $178,500 discrepancy in hospitals’ billings for
a common medical treatment); Cathy O’Donnell, 2 Westchester Hospitals Overbilled
Medicaid; South Shore Agrees to Pay $2.2 Million, LOHUD.COM (Apr. 19, 2012, 12:40 AM),
http://www.lohud.com/article/20120419/NEWS02/304190062/2-Westchesterhospitals-overbilled-Medicaid-Sound-Shore-agrees-pay-2-2M (discovering one hospital
defrauded Medicaid out of over a million dollars); Jordan Rau, Which Hospitals’
Patients Cost Medicare the Most? A Top 10 List, CAPSULES: THE KHN BLOG (May 11,
2012, 6:00 AM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2012/05/whichhospitals-patients-cost-medicare-the-most-a-top-10-list (looking at government
research that ranks which hospitals’ Medicare patients cost the most); State’s High
Court to Weigh in on Lawsuit over IU Health Billing, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Apr. 29, 2012),
http://www.ibj.com/article/print?articleId=34123 (tracking a case alleging a
hospital discriminated against its uninsured patients by charging them more than
insured patients); Greta Weiderman, Thomases File Class Action Suit Against Tenet
Health System, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (May 22, 2012, 7:49 AM CDT),
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2012/05/21/thomas-files-class-action-suit
-against.html (reporting the filing of a class action lawsuit that “seeks to recover the
amounts that [two hospitals] . . . have charged for what the suit alleges are
misleading and undisclosed ‘hospital’ facility fees for non-hospital services at
doctors’ offices and outpatient clinics”); Sam Wood, Temple University Settles with
Feds in Multi-Million Dollar Hospital Fraud Schemes, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 16, 2012, at
A19 (reporting on a department chair at a medical school being charged with
seventy-three counts of fraud).

HAFEMEISTERPORTER.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

558

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:12 PM

[Vol. 62:513

patients who are readmitted within thirty days but which significantly
increase out-of-pocket costs for patients or otherwise deny them
access to needed follow-up care;178
(11) the increased use of dedicated hospital physicians
(hospitalists) directly employed by the hospital, rather than relying
on relatively independent community-based physicians granted
hospital privileges;179 and

178. The growing use of observation stays, whereby patients are placed “under
observation” rather than “admitted,” has gained particular attention of late. See Zhanlian
Feng et al., Sharp Rise in Medicare Enrollees Being Held in Hospitals for Observation Raises Concerns
About Causes and Consequences, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1251, 1251–52, 1257 (2012) (speculating that
the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 may have
exacerbated this trend because it imposes penalties on hospitals with higher-than-expected
readmission rates; and noting that concerns about this practice recently led to a
congressional briefing and class action lawsuits); J. Lester Feder, Hospital Billing Shifting
Costs, POLITICO (June 4, 2012, 10:36 PM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm
?uuid=5F26A362-8DFD-4A74-9E25-A7E7366C5A7E (examining research that suggests
placing Medicare patients on “observation status” can cause them significant financial
harm); Susan Jaffe, Study: Hospital Observation Stays Increase 25 Percent in 3 Years, CAPSULES:
THE KHN BLOG (June 4, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.p
hp/2012/06/study-hospital-observation-stays-increase-25-percent-in-3-years (noting the
“troubling” trend of an increasing number of Medicare patients entering hospitals being
placed on observation status during their stay while the level of admissions declined, and
expressing concern that hospitals may be using this practice to avoid having these
patients counted as readmissions should they later return to the hospital after being
discharged); David Morgan, Medicare Beneficiaries Sue US Over Hospital Stays, REUTERS (Nov.
3, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/03/usa-medicare-lawsuitidUSN1E7A21ST20111103 (describing the filing of a lawsuit in which the sharp increase
in the practice of placing Medicare patients on observation status and thereby denying
them Medicare Part A coverage, which only covers admitted patients, was challenged);
Bernice Yeung, ‘Observation Stays’ for Medicare Patients Create Coverage Problems, CAL. WATCH
(June 4, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/observation-stays-medicarepatients-create-coverage-problems-16444 (relaying the account of a Medicare patient who
unexpectedly incurred significant post-hospitalization expenses because when she
previously entered a hospital she was placed on “observation” rather than admitted, with
the latter necessary for Medicare to cover these expenses).
179. See Robert M. Wachter, Models of Hospital Care, in HOSPITAL MEDICINE, supra
note 42, at 3, 3 (noting that the majority of hospital care in the U.S. is now provided
by hospital-based physicians). This trend is fueled by more doctors, particularly
younger doctors, wanting the job security and set hours of hospital employment. See
Hilgers & Welch, supra note 158, at 3 (recognizing that younger physicians seek a
different career and lifestyle track, inducing new doctors to become “physicianemployees” rather than owners of their own practice); Harris Gardiner, More Doctors
Giving Up Private Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at B1 (linking a decline in the
number of privately owned clinics to young physicians needing to repay large
medical debts and seeking a work-life balance); Appleby, supra note 165 (discussing
the trend of an increasing number of doctors seeking employment with hospitals
instead of running their own private practices); Bob Mook, Docs Flock to Hospitals, Larger
Group Practices, DENV. BUS. J. (Jan. 17, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com
/denver/stories/2010/01/18/story6.html (blaming “bureaucratic red tape” for the
increasing trend of doctors leaving private practice to seek employment with hospitals
or large practice groups).
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(12) the exercise of greater control over medical staff by hospital
administrators,180 including the purported widespread use of a
physician “code of conduct.”181
D. The Fiduciary Nature of the Hospital-Patient Relationship
Concurrent with the emergence of these factors, a hospital’s legal
responsibility for its patients’ well-being and associated liability for
failing to provide adequate services has greatly expanded over the
past century.182 Overall, the trajectory of this intertwined evolution of
law and health care delivery predicts the same conclusion as presentday observational evidence; namely, that hospitals and their patients
have developed a relationship that looks remarkably fiduciary in
nature.183
When viewed through a fiduciary lens, the hospital-patient
relationship clearly reflects a striking superiority in expertise,
knowledge, capability, power, and access to critical information and
technology on one side, and a pronounced dependence and
vulnerability on the other.184 Hospitals have become a concentrated
locus of complex health care delivery, through which multiple care
providers treat a patient185 using ever-more expensive and
180. See Richard L. Reece, Hospitals Gaining Leverage Over Physicians, MEDINNOVATION
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://medinnovationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/hospitals-gainingleverage-over.html (explaining how over the last 24 years hospitals have steadily gained
leverage over practicing physicians); see also Hilgers & Welch, supra note 158, at 10
(arguing that hospital employment will cause a transformation in the practices of
physicians, resulting in their having less control over their clinical methods).
181. See Lawrence R. Huntoon, Editorial: The Insulting Physician “Code of Conduct”,
13 J. AMER. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 2, 2–3 (2008) (describing the physician “code of
conduct” as a list of prohibited behaviors that physicians must sign to have hospital
privileges, and arguing that the hospital’s purpose in imposing this code is to exert
“authority and control over physicians”); see also Roger Collier, Physician Codes of
Conduct Becoming a Norm, 183 CMAJ 892, 892 (2011) (explaining that supporters
argue that such codes improve professionalism and decrease disruptive behavior,
while critics argue they insult doctors and “reek[] of authoritarianism”).
182. See supra Part III (discussing hospitals’ legal duties to their patients); see, e.g.,
Gillum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. App. 1989) (“In
Texas, . . . a duty exists between a hospital and its patients to provide them with a
certain level of medical care, the breach of which duty results in liability on the
hospital.”); see also Rutchik, supra note 110, at 551 & nn.129–31 (providing an
overview of the evolution of hospital liability stemming from its physicians’ acts).
183. See Furrow, supra note 111, at 456–84 (identifying the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between a hospital and its patients).
184. See infra notes 191–203 and accompanying text.
185. See Nicole Blay et al., Patient Transfers in Australia: Implications for Nursing Workload
and Patient Outcomes, J. NURSING MGMT. 1, 4 (2011) (“During an average length of stay of
5 days, patient and health professional interactions can involve between 17 and 26
individuals.”); Naomi Whitt et al., How Many Health Professionals Does a Patient See During an
Average Hospital Stay?, 120 N.Z. MED. J. 1253, 1253 (2007) (reporting that surgery patients
saw an average of 26.6 health care professionals (including ten doctors) during their
hospitalization, while all other patients saw an average of 17.8 health care professionals
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sophisticated technology186 in ways that increasingly usurp the role
traditionally played by a designated treating physician.187
Hospitals typically care for the sickest and most severely injured
patients, with these patients tending to be the most vulnerable and
dependent in the healthcare system, an increasingly pronounced
trend.188 Patients admitted through the emergency room, for
example, are likely to be experiencing impaired decision-making
capacity during a time of medical crisis.189 Even patients fortunate
enough to choose the time and place of their admission arrive under
a cloud of serious illness or injury; one they must rely on their care
providers to dispel.190 When in such dire straits, patients tend to
(including six doctors)); see also NAT’L TRANSITIONS OF CARE COAL., IMPROVING
TRANSITIONS OF CARE 1 (2010), available at http://www.ntocc.org/Portals/0/PDF/
Resources/NTOCCIssueBriefs.pdf (“Between 41.9 and 70 percent of Medicare patients
admitted to the hospital . . . received services from an average of 10 or more physicians
during their stay.”).
186. See, e.g., Robert Langreth, Prostate Cancer Therapy Too Good To Be True Explodes
Health Care Cost, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2012, 12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2012-03-26/prostate-cancer-therapy-too-good-to-be-true-explodes-health-cost.html
(describing proton beam technology used to treat prostate cancer as delivered by 500-ton
machines in facilities costing $100 million to $200 million and requiring a football-field
sized building to house it).
187. This trend has been observed for some time. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Making Hospitals Accountable, 32 REGULATION 30, 30 (2009) (depicting today’s
healthcare delivery system as a “complex web of interactions” among diverse health
care providers, which necessitates increased coordination and accountability);
Southwick, supra note 97, at 429, 435 (explaining that modern hospitals play an
active role in patient care as their “range of services continues to develop and
expand”).
188. See Classen et al., supra note 162, at 586 (suggesting that the increasing
severity of hospital patients’ illnesses may partially explain the increase in adverse
events occurring in hospitals); Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of
Patients as Medical Consumers, 96 GEO. L.J. 583, 584–86 (2008) (noting that the law
historically views the physician-patient relationship as one characterized by
dependency and vulnerability).
189. See Cheryl Clark, Sicker Patients Seeking Emergency Care, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA
(July 29, 2009), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/PHY-236638/SickerPatients-Seeking-Emergency-Care (discussing research results that suggest patients
using emergency room care are significantly sicker than patients accessing emergency
services in previous years); Hope and Optimism May Cloud Judgment in ICUs, HEALTHDAY
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/Article.asp?AID=662433
(finding that family members typically make medical decisions for family members who
are seriously ill); see also INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF EMERGENCY CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES HEALTH SYSTEM—REPORT BRIEF 6 (2006) (recommending improvements to the
delivery of emergency care); John C. Moskop et al., Emergency Department Crowding, Part
1—Concept, Causes, and Moral Consequences, 53 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 605, 606–08
(2009) (citing overcrowding as another reason for diminished emergency room care).
190. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence To Consent to
Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834 (2007) (asserting that ordinarily a critical
first step in healthcare is “determin[ing] patients’ capacity and decid[ing] when to
seek substituted consent”); Vanessa Raymont et al., Prevalence of Mental Incapacity in
Medical Inpatients and Associated Risk Factors: Cross-sectional Study, 364 LANCET 1421,
1421 (2004) (estimating that at least 40% of medical inpatients lacked the mental
capacity to consent to treatment).
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accept their health care providers’ advice without question,
rendering them dependent upon their providers and especially
vulnerable to catastrophic results if these providers fail to devote
themselves to addressing their needs.191 Traditionally, patients’
treating physicians provided this expertise.192 Today, however, a
range of specialists are likely to treat a hospital patient over short
intervals of time, with hospital staff and hospitalists playing a more
direct role in the care the patient receives.193
Widespread levels of poor health literacy, compounded by the
increasingly complex and technological nature of health care
interventions, exacerbates the dependence and vulnerability of
hospital patients.194 Courts require physicians to obtain informed
consent from their patients before performing any procedure,195 yet
almost half (47%) of adults “will find the process of informed
consent arduous” and most will not be capable of providing true
informed consent to the proposed procedure.196 Studies have shown
that “most [consumer] health materials fall into reading level ranges
requiring high school, college, or graduate degrees . . . [, which
exceed] the reading abilities of the average American adult.”197 This
pervasive healthcare illiteracy leaves hospitalized patients highly
191. See Coleman & Berenson, supra note 26, at 533 (noting the dependency and
passivity of patients while hospitalized and how poorly they may do upon discharge
when they are abruptly expected to assume responsibility for their recovery, often
with little support or preparation); Moe Litman, Fiduciary Law in the Hospital Context:
The Prescriptive Duty of Protective Intervention, 15 HEALTH L.J. 295, 307 (2007)
(reiterating that hospitalized patients rely on their health care providers for care and
expertise to the point of dependence “on the hospitals in whose care they are in”).
192. See supra notes 26, 187 and accompanying text; see also Clark C.
Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals:
An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional
Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1074–75 (noting that the physician used to be
the “final arbitrator” of treatment).
193. See supra notes 26, 179, 185 and accompanying text; see also FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 76, at 373 (“The modern hospital—with . . . its complex diagnostic
equipment and laboratories, its large staffs of nurses, doctors, and support
personnel—has come to symbolize the delivery of medical care.”).
194. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
195. See Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent
Liability for Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2006) (listing the duties of
hospitals as including: obtaining informed consent, disseminating information to
patients, and assisting patients with the decision making process).
196. See HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 87, at 1, 62 (finding that illiteracy inhibits
many patients from receiving proper treatment post-discharge and frustrates the
purpose of informed consent). It has been noted that “informed consent law falls
short of realizing shared decisionmaking because it does not require physicians to
assure that patients understand the information that is provided to them or to help
patients identify and apply their own values to the treatment information
provided. . . . [I]t is possible for a physician to merely warn patients about treatment
risks in order to comply with the law and yet fall far short of the shared
decisionmaking ideal.” Gatter, supra note 195, at 1213.
197. HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 87, at 22–23.
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dependent on hospital staff for guidance. Notwithstanding that
hospitals increasingly control the consent process by dictating how
informed consent is obtained,198 courts have consistently held that
hospitals have no duty to ensure that patients receive relevant
treatment information from their treating physician, nor are
hospitals required to independently obtain informed consent.199
The vulnerability of hospital patients is particularly acute because
they may feel their condition and lack of understanding leave them
little choice but to give their “consent” and hope that the hospital
truly has their best interests at heart.200 While there are often steps
that vulnerable parties in contractual relationships can take to
protect themselves,201 such tools tend to be unavailable to or
ineffective for hospital patients.202 In some cases, hospital patients
are essentially a captive audience with no means to personally gauge
the validity of the advice they are given, minimal opportunity to seek
input from other experts due to time or financial limitations, and

198. See Gatter, supra note 195, at 1234, 1240 (noting that hospitals often develop
their own consent forms that physicians use to record consent and explaining that
hospitals may control the process of obtaining consent through electronic informed
consent applications).
199. See id. at 1207–08, 1216–17 (noting that since 1967 courts have consistently
found that hospitals do not have a duty to obtain informed consent as that duty
continues to fall on physicians).
200. See Leslie F. Degner et al., Information Needs and Decisional Preferences in Women
with Breast Cancer, 277 JAMA 1485, 1485, 1489 (1997) (noting that 34% of patients
wanted to delegate responsibility for selecting their treatment).
201. Patients, for example, may have access to illness-specific support groups or seek
treatment-related information via the Internet. See Jan Hoffman, Getting Help: Patients
Turn to Advocates, Support Groups and E-Mail, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 19
(discussing groups that provide both support and education regarding treatment
programs). Yet, while medical information may be increasingly available, patients’ ability
to make use of that information remains suspect. See Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra
note 123, at 335 (illustrating a patient’s disregarding medical information through an
example where a patient is warned about the dangers of a drug but demands it anyway).
Alternatively, patients concerned about their future ability to make a medical
decision may execute an advance directive in an attempt to guide the course of
treatment when the occasion arises, but few individuals prepare such documents or
accurately anticipate the decisions to be made. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-life
Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. ConsensusBased Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 338–40, 345, 347 (1999) (discussing
advance directive statutes and the general right of patients to execute advance
directives, but describing the problems that frequently preclude their use); Sarah
Barr, Despite Best Intentions, Californian’s Don’t Talk About End-of-Life Wishes, CAPSULES:
THE KHN BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.
php/2012/02/despite-best-intentions-californians-dont-talk-about-end-of-life-wishes
(reporting that although 82% of Californians believe it is important to put their endof-life plans in writing, only 23% have done so).
202. See Litman, supra note 191, at 334 (recognizing that there is little that patients
can do to protect themselves from suffering harm while visiting a hospital, for they
are often “personally and situationally vulnerable”).
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insufficient physical or mental capacity to simply walk away and seek
care elsewhere.203
With their health and potentially their lives at risk, patients should
be able to rely on their institutional care providers without fear that
their interests will be sidelined for the sake of expediency or profit.204
However, evidence suggests that hospitals are susceptible to the same
temptations to engage in self-interested behavior as more traditional
fiduciaries when their financial interests conflict with those of the
people it is their raison d’être to serve.205 And, unlike in an earlier
era,206 hospitals’ expanded operations and authority have a far
greater ability to direct patient care,207 which means self-interested
behavior poses a greater risk to their patients.
Some of the clearest indicators that hospitals are not always guided
by their patients’ best interests are metrics comparing the
experiences of insured and uninsured patients. Despite federal
legislation208 and institutional pronouncements209 championing equal

203. See id. (finding patients reliant on hospitals to treat serious illnesses and
injuries, and provide them with quality care).
204. See Gatter, supra note 195, at 1268–69 (asserting that hospitals owe a fiduciary
duty to patients because hospitals have an “obligation to protect the well-being of
patients under their care”).
205. See id. at 1271–72 (enumerating the various interests a hospital may attempt
to serve during the informed consent process, including: “its own interests to
increase the likelihood that physicians will refer patients to the hospital, to free-up
clinical time for physicians to provide additional fee-generating procedures, to
improve the public image of the hospital, or to increase its patient satisfaction
scores”).
206. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text (discussing how early hospital
facilities were intended to only provide a physical structure and the tools and staff
physicians needed to provide care for their patients).
207. See supra notes 179–81, 193 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987) (mandating hospitals provide an
appropriate medical screening examination to individuals who come to the hospital’s
emergency room requesting a medical examination or treatment, and if it is
determined that they have an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide
such treatment as is needed to stabilize the medical condition, regardless of whether
these individuals can pay for these services or are eligible for medical benefits).
Congress passed EMTALA amid growing concerns of inadequate emergency room care
for poor and uninsured patients. H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, at 5 (1985).
209. See, e.g., Credit, Billing, and Collection Policy for Patients in Need of Financial
Aid, VIRGINIAHOSPITALCENTER.COM, http://www.virginiahospitalcenter.com/patients
/financial_need.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“It is the policy of [the] Virginia
Hospital Center to provide caring healthcare services to patients 24 hours a day 7
days a week regardless of the ability to pay . . . .”); Mission Statement and Vision,
GREENWICH
HOSP.,
http://www.greenhosp.org/about-greenwich-hospital/missionstatement-and-vision (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“Individuals within the communities we
serve are assured access to quality health care regardless of ability to pay.”); Our Mission,
Strategic Vision, and History, ALAMEDA CNTY. MED. CTR., http://www.acmedctr.org/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“It is our mission to maintain and improve the health of all
residents of Alameda County, California, regardless of ability to pay.”).
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quality of care for patients regardless of their insurance status or
ability to pay, the data suggest that hospitals treat uninsured patients
Though the precise mechanics underlying the
differently.210
discrepancies in hospital stay length, resource and procedure
utilization, and treatment outcomes between insured and uninsured
patients are debatable, these differences are precisely what one would
expect to observe if a hospital were motivated by financial incentives
rather than patient wellbeing: unprofitable patients receive fewer
hospital resources.
Finally, imposing a fiduciary duty on hospitals is appropriate given
that they are often the least cost avoider of problems that may
otherwise be extraordinarily difficult and expensive to prevent.211
When the utility of a critically important and socially beneficial
relationship would be lost due to the excessive costs of monitoring
the quality and loyalty of one party’s performance, fiduciary law
imposes obligations on that party to remain loyal and forgo selfserving behavior that might otherwise be tolerable in ordinary
contractual relationships.212 As described, the typical patient is not
capable of personally evaluating whether a hospital’s actions are
motivated by loyalty or self-interest, or whether to retain an
independent expert to monitor the hospital’s actions.213 Just as it is
210. See MIKA NAGAMINE ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY,
STATISTICAL BRIEF NO. 88, HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT TRENDS IN
UNINSURED HOSPITAL STAYS, 1998–2007, at 2 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb88.pdf (finding that the average
amount spent by a hospital on a patient per stay, as well as the length of those stays,
are less for uninsured patients); Wendy R. Greene et al., Insurance Status Is a Potent
Predictor of Outcomes in Both Blunt and Penetrating Trauma, 199 AM. J. SURGERY 554, 556
(2010) (finding uninsured trauma patients were more likely to die than insured
patients); Omar Hasan et al., Insurance Status and Hospital Care for Myocardial
Infarction, Stroke, and Pneumonia, 5 J. HOSP. MED. 452, 456 (2010) (finding hospital
resource utilization rates lower and mortality rates higher for uninsured patients);
Arch G. Mainous III et al., Impact of Insurance and Hospital Ownership on Hospital Length
of Stay Among Patients with Ambulatory Care-Sensitive Conditions, 9 ANNALS FAM. MED.
489, 493 (2011) (finding the average length of hospital stays are shorter for
uninsured patients).
211. See Furrow, supra note 111, at 456–59 (noting that provider-caused injury is
predictable and preventable yet continues to be ranked as one of the leading causes
of death in the United States); Rotman, supra note 122, at 932–33 (explaining that
due to the dependent and vulnerable nature of a beneficiary, fiduciary relationships
benefit society “by enhancing productivity and knowledge, facilitating specialization,
and creating fiscal and informational wealth.”).
212. Rotman, supra note 122, at 932–34, 951 (explaining that beneficiaries do not
need to monitor the actions of a fiduciary because the fiduciary assumes the burden
of compliance).
213. See supra notes 184–203 and accompanying text. See generally Furrow, supra
note 111, at 456–84 (noting that patients rely on hospitals to provide them with
adequate healthcare and highlighting that hospitals are in the best position to
address a patient’s medical needs).
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unreasonable to expect litigants to hire a second attorney to monitor
the work of one currently employed, or an investor to retain a second
broker to oversee the one trading stocks, it is unreasonable to expect
patients to monitor their hospital for self-serving behavior. In this
context, fiduciary law provides a tool to promote loyalty and protect
the integrity of the hospital-patient relationship.214
In light of this, courts have grown more sympathetic to the
predicament of patients and more willing to use available legal
doctrine to hold hospitals accountable for their patients’ wellbeing,215
with “the language of fiduciary duty” entering the legal discourse
about the provision of care and the occurrence of errors in the
hospital setting.216
With post-discharge injuries and avoidable
rehospitalizations in the spotlight, the time has come to formally
recognize the fiduciary relationship between hospitals and their
patients, and to employ associated obligations to address these and
other issues that currently lack a needed remedy.

214. See Rotman, supra note 122, at 932–34 (asserting that fiduciary law prevents
those who hold power in the fiduciary relationship from abusing a beneficiary’s trust
and reliance); see also Furrow, supra note 111, at 440–45 (stating that fiduciary law
obligates a fiduciary to be loyal to the beneficiary due to the beneficiary’s
dependence and reliance on the fiduciary’s services, knowledge, and power).
215. See supra notes 100–01, 153–82 and accompanying text; see also Furrow, supra
note 111, at 459 (noting that courts have been more willing to stretch agency
exceptions to allow patients to recover against hospitals).
216. Furrow, supra note 111, at 460; see, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary’s Hosp., No. 051665 (DRD-SDW), 2006 WL 2038498, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19, 2006) (recognizing that a
hospital owes a fiduciary duty to patients with regard to their capacity to provide
medical services), aff’d, 530 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2008); Ballard v. Advocate Health &
Hosp. Corps., No. 97 C 6104, 1999 WL 498702, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1999)
(denying defendant hospital’s motion for summary judgment in a medical
malpractice suit where the court found the patient justifiably relied on the hospital
and not a specific physician); Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1287–88 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998) (stating that under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be
vicariously liable for a doctor’s negligence unless the patient knew or should have
known that the doctor was an independent contractor); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp.
Ass’n, 366 A.2d 641, 645 (N.J. 1976) (emphasizing that hospitals have a fiduciary duty
to exercise their managerial powers reasonably and “for the public good” as they are
a quasi-public trust); Grodjesk v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 343 A.2d 489, 500 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (ascertaining that a hospital has a fiduciary duty to provide
adequate facilities for its patients); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr.,
628 N.E.2d 46, 52–53 (Ohio 1994) (ruling that a hospital that holds itself out to the
public to be a medical provider is liable for a physician’s negligent acts if a patient
looks to the hospital, as opposed to a specific physician, to provide medical care);
White v. Methodist Hosp. S., 844 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning
that hospitals can be held vicariously liable for doctors in emergency room or
operating room settings because people often seek treatment from a particular
hospital rather than a particular doctor).
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IV. THE NATURE OF HOSPITALS’ DISCHARGE-RELATED FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS
A. The Rationale for Imposing Discharge-Related Obligations
With respect to discharges, hospitals, as fiduciaries, should be
obligated to take reasonable steps commensurate with their patients’
continuing health risks to promote these patients’ health until they
have had a reasonable opportunity to establish or resume a
relationship with a community-based physician. This duty, to assist
patients during the transition to the care of another provider, is an
integral part of the hospital-patient fiduciary relationship for several
reasons. First, it recognizes the highly vulnerable and dependent
state of many hospital patients following discharge and the unique
ability of hospitals to provide this service. Second, it represents a
logical extension of the services already provided by hospitals and
reinforces the trust and loyalty that should permeate the hospitalpatient relationship. Third, it requires a service that is critically
needed by discharged patients (and society) that hospitals can
readily, efficiently, and effectively supply, and it acts as a safeguard
against the very type of injurious, self-interested behavior that
fiduciary doctrine is designed to deter.
Unlike some fiduciary relationships, where the relationship
revolves around a specific transaction that has a clearly defined
end,217 the needs of hospital patients often lack a similar level of
demarcation. While one’s reliance on legal representation may end
with the closure of a case, or the value of financial management may
end with the exhaustion of a trust, a patient’s need for medical
assistance frequently does not vanish after exiting the hospital. A
discharge from the hospital rarely, if ever, means that a patient has
fully recovered or attained perfect health.218 On the contrary, a
discharge is most often a transition from one stage of care and one
care provider to another, not an indication that the need for care has
passed. Knowing this, and recognizing patients’ limited medical
217. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943) (assessing a set of
stock transactions, finding a clear fiduciary relationship between the respondents
and their company because they were to serve the company’s best interests).
218. See, e.g., Liang-Kung Chen et al., Effectiveness of Community Hospital-Based PostAcute Care on Functional Recovery and 12-month Mortality in Older Patients: A Prospective
Cohort Study, 42 ANNALS MED. 630, 630 (2010) (noting that older patients are often
discharged before they are fully recovered); Patient Care Coordination, ANTELOPE
VALLEY HOSP., http://www.avhospital.org/Services/PatientCareCoordination/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (warning that discharge does not signal that
the patient is fully recovered, but rather that the patient’s “condition is stable and no
longer requires acute hospital care”).
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knowledge,
general
health
illiteracy,
vulnerability,
and
219
dependence, an expectation that discharged patients can safely and
effectively manage their own care is at best overly optimistic, and at
worst dangerously irresponsible. As a fiduciary armed with this
knowledge, a hospital cannot simply look the other way and hope for
the best as its patients are waved out the door. Fiduciary law
demands more.
Another aspect of the hospital-patient relationship that supports
the recognition of post-discharge duties is that hospitals are the
source of many patients’ post-discharge risks. These risks typically
arise out of the very circumstances that the patient’s relationship with
the hospital was intended to address, as a period of recovery and
compromised bodily function typically follows most hospital
treatments.220 But the hospital itself may have also inadvertently
created risks, as is the case with a health care-acquired infection or
some other care-related adverse event.221 Once a hospital undertakes
to treat a patient, so long as risks attendant to the hospitalization
remain, it is patently unacceptable for it to withdraw all assistance
before another care provider can reasonably assume responsibility for
the patient. Just as there are restrictions on other fiduciaries walking
away from their duties before a substitute is in place,222 a hospital
219. See supra notes 188–98 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Christopher P. Silveri & Mary Claire Walsh, Surgery Recovery: From
Hospital to Home, S PINE UNIVERSE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.spineuniverse.com
/treatments/surgery/surgery-recovery-hospital-home (explaining that all surgical
procedures require a recovery period, both in the hospital and at home).
221. See R. DOUGLAS SCOTT, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE DIRECT
MEDICAL COSTS OF HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS IN U.S. HOSPITALS AND THE
BENEFITS OF PREVENTION 1 (Mar. 2009) (stating that 4.5 healthcare-associated
infections occur for every 100 hospital admissions); Bernard Friedman et al., Do
Patient Safety Events Increase Readmissions?, 47 MED. CARE 583, 585 (2009) (reporting
that approximately 2.6% of 1.5 million adult surgery patients experienced a patient
safety event during hospitalization); Jeneen Interlandi, Beating Back the Bugs: Some
Hospitals Have Turned a Corner in Fighting Deadly Infections, SCIENTIFIC AM., May 2011,
at 24 (noting that “nearly two million hospital-acquired infections claim roughly
100,000 lives and add $45 billion in costs” per year); Rebecca R. Roberts et al., Costs
Attributable to Healthcare-Acquired Infection in Hospitalized Adults and a Comparison of
Economic Methods, 48 MED. CARE 1026, 1028–29 (2010) (finding that 12.7% of
hospitalized high-risk adult patients developed a healthcare-acquired infection, with
an attributable mortality of 6.1%); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text
(discussing the adverse effects of hospitalization and related costs). Hospital
readmissions are often directly attributable to these events. See Friedman et al.,
supra note 221, at 583 (determining that the three-month readmission rate was
17% for patients with no hospital-related safety event, but 25% when such an event
was recorded).
222. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-7-707(a) (2011) (stating that a trustee
retains duties and powers until property is delivered to successor); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-758(A) (West 2012) (requiring notice period or court order before trustee
can resign).
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should also be prohibited from abandoning responsibilities that flow
from the services it provides and from which it profits.223
The expectations of patients further justify post-discharge duties.
Patients expect hospitals, as institutions, to care for them,224 an
expectation that hospitals do little to dispel.225 If anything, hospitals
reinforce that expectation by employing ever greater numbers of
their own physicians,226 by holding themselves out as full-service
providers through extensive marketing campaigns,227 and by
participating more directly than ever in the provision of care.228
Given that hospitals now interact more directly with patients in ways
that were once exclusively within the realm of physicians, patients
have the right to expect the same degree of loyalty and responsibility
from a hospital as they expect from a physician.229 The long-standing
legal and ethical prohibition on patient abandonment by
physicians230 should be recognized to have an analog that prohibits
hospitals, as part of their fiduciary duty, from abandoning at-risk
patients when they are discharged from the hospital.
In addition, permitting hospitals to choose whether to provide
reasonable oversight of recently discharged patients creates an
unacceptable conflict of interest in light of hospitals’ fiduciary
obligations.231 Under the current payment model, hospitals receive
223. See supra notes 163–78 and accompanying text.
224. See Litman, supra note 191, at 334 (“[I]t can hardly be doubted that there is a
widespread and deeply held conviction that patients can expect loyal and dedicated
commitment from hospitals and hospital staff.”).
225. Direct advertising by hospitals to prospective patients emphasizing that they
are a comprehensive service provider has increased in recent years. See David
Oxman, Hospital Advertising: Is It Time for a Closer Look?, HOSPITALIST (Jan. 2007),
http://www.the-hospitalist.org/details/article/241425/Hospital_Advertising.html
(explaining that advertising by health care providers, including hospitals, was taboo until
increasing economic pressures and changing cultural norms led to the demise of these
proscriptions, with such advertisements now common). Such advertisements frequently
use language implying that the hospital is the treatment provider. See, e.g., Print
Advertisement, Beaufort Memorial Hospital Orthopedics Program (on file with law
review) (“Beaufort Memorial’s Total Joint Program assures personalized,
individualized care, from diagnosis through recovery.”); Print Advertisement,
Children’s Memorial Hospital (on file with Law Review) (“[W]e lead one of the
largest pediatric stem cell transplant programs in the nation.”); Print Advertisement,
Seattle Children’s, available at www.seattlechildrens.org/pdf/urgent-care-minus-thetraffic.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“Whether it’s a sports injury, the flu, or
ongoing treatment of a chronic illness, you can count on the expertise and
compassion of Seattle Children’s.”).
226. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 161, 225 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 180–81, 185–87 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part IV.
230. See supra note 86.
231. See Rotman, supra note 122, at 941–42, 959–60 (explaining that fiduciary
law requires the fiduciary to avoid conflicts of interest and imposes “strict duties
on fiduciaries, including . . . requiring fiduciaries to act selflessly and in the best
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compensation for medical services supplied, not for minimizing
service utilization.232 This means that by failing to provide relatively
inexpensive interventions that reduce the likelihood of postdischarge complications, hospitals can profit when they readmit and
treat former patients.233 Consequently, despite the fact that it is the
avowed purpose of hospitals to heal their patients, under the
predominant legal doctrine hospitals can allow preventable harm to
occur and then profit from their inactivity—conduct which should
be impermissible when a fiduciary’s beneficiary is involved.234
Though such behavior is perhaps within the “morals of the market
place,”235 it is not tolerable from institutions charged with the
delivery of health care.236

interests of their beneficiaries”); see also supra notes 79, 140, 205 and
accompanying text.
232. See Abdulrahman El-Sayed, Prevention vs. Treatment and the Perverse
Incentives Inflating the Costs of Healthcare, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2011 3:17
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abdulrahman-m-elsayed/health-care-prevention
_b_1015734.html (noting that the current payment system pays health care providers
for each action they provide to a patient). But see Improving Care Coordination and
Lowering Costs by Bundling Payments, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.health
care.gov/news/factsheets/2011/08/bundling08232011a.html (noting that rather than
make separate payments for the various services provided, efforts are being made
under the PPACA to reduce healthcare fragmentation and costs by bundling the
payments for services across a given episode of care (e.g., a hip replacement) “to
encourage doctors, hospitals and other health care providers to work together to
better coordinate care for patients both when they are in the hospital and after
they are discharged”); Michael L. Millenson, Analysis: ACOs Could Have the Medicare
Muscle To Transform Health System, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 2, 2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/may/02/millenson-acos-muscle-totransform-system.aspx (explaining that the “accountable care organization”
introduced in conjunction with the 2010 passage of the PPACA replaces the idea of
reimbursing individual doctors and hospitals for each procedure they perform with
instead a lump-sum payment to a group of health care providers working as a team,
with reimbursements based on a patient’s health outcome, satisfaction, and costs).
233. See, e.g., Young, supra note 8 (analyzing records of 5.8 million incidents in
which a patient went back to a hospital to be re-treated, and finding that
readmissions added $8.7 billion a year or 15.7% of the cost of caring for these
patients). But see supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (discussing PPACA
provisions pursuant to which hospitals have begun to incur reductions in their
Medicare reimbursement levels for unduly high readmission rates for Medicare
patients).
234. See Furrow, supra note 111, at 446 (noting a hospital’s duty to protect patients
from “unnecessarily risky operations”); Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary
Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424, 432 (2006) (stating that a
fiduciary has a duty to act to protect, promote, preserve, or secure the interests of a
beneficiary).
235. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that
conduct typical of an ordinary contractual relationship is impermissible in a fiduciary
relationship where a fiduciary owes the beneficiary undivided loyalty).
236. See infra Part IV.B–C.
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B. The Obligation to Prepare Patients for Discharge
Two primary obligations comprise a hospital’s fiduciary duty to
discharged patients. The first involves preparing a patient for
discharge. For example, a congressional research report noted that:
Medicare regulations . . . require[] participating hospitals . . . to
have a discharge planning process that applies to all patients.
[They] must identify patients expected to experience adverse
health consequences upon discharge and provide them with a
discharge planning evaluation. . . . If the discharge planning
evaluation indicates a need for a discharge plan, the hospital must
develop one. . . . The hospital must arrange for initial
implementation of the patient’s discharge plan and must update
the discharge plan, when necessary, and counsel the patient and
family members (or interested parties) to prepare them for posthospital care.237

This report also noted, in what may reflect some of the specific
steps that a hospital may need to execute to meet a related fiduciary
duty, that “[the discharge planning] evaluation must be made on a
timely basis and must include an evaluation of the patient’s likely
need for post-acute services and the availability of those services,” the
results of this evaluation must be discussed with the patient or the
patient’s representative, and “[b]oth the discharge plan evaluation
and a discharge plan must be developed by, or under the supervision
of, a registered professional nurse, social worker, or other
appropriately qualified personnel.”238 The report further stated that,
notwithstanding these requirements, studies have identified instances
when the required discharge planning was incomplete and hospitals
did not timely provide necessary information to involved postdischarge health care providers.239 Nevertheless, there is little
controversy that adequate discharge planning is a hospital’s
responsibility.240
237. STONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 12 (noting that these Medicare
regulations will cover more than 90% of all acute-care hospitals in the United States).
238. Id.
239. See id. (establishing that although Medicare requirements mandate such
discharge planning, hospitals do not necessarily comply); see also supra Parts I–II.
240. See Amy J.H. Kind & Maureen A. Smith, Documentation of Mandated Discharge
Summary Components in Transitions from Acute to Subacute Care, in ADVANCES IN PATIENT
SAFETY: NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 1, 1 (Kirm Henriksen et al.
eds., 2005) (noting the importance that hospital discharge summaries play in
communicating a patient’s care plan to the post-hospital care team, and discussing
The Joint Commission’s established standards (Standard IM.6.10, EP 7), which set
forth the requisite components of hospital discharge summaries); see also JOINT
COMM’N, ADVANCING EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, AND
PATIENT- AND FAMILY-CENTERED CARE: A ROADMAP FOR HOSPITALS 29–31 (2010)
(explaining that hospitals should take responsibility for discharge planning and work
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C. The Obligation to Provide Reasonable Post-Discharge Assistance
The second obligation, which hospitals even more often fail to
fulfill, is to provide reasonable post-discharge assistance for a period
of time commensurate with their patients’ continuing health care
risks or until another health care provider has assumed responsibility
for the patient.241 However, a number of hospitals, no doubt
recognizing the mutually beneficial nature of this service,242 are now
beginning to provide it voluntarily.243 Though the level of postdischarge contact and assistance that a hospital owes a patient will
necessarily vary with the circumstances, some degree of medical
monitoring is a critical component because it can detect dangerous
situations and avert related crises.244 If monitoring detects a postdischarge problem arising, this information should be promptly
communicated to the patient or the patient’s surrogate, and the
patient should be directed to seek medical assistance.245
D. Model Programs
This Article does not purport to fully outline what a hospital must
reasonably do to meet its fiduciary obligations to discharged patients.
with patients on an individual basis to effectively satisfy each patient’s unique postdischarge needs).
241. See supra notes 5–12, 22–29, 33 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
242. Based on their increased use, see infra note 243 and accompanying text,
hospitals appear to be discovering that these services can be delivered efficiently,
effectively, and without undue burden, and that they may also be financially
beneficial. See Anna Sommers & Peter J. Cunningham, Physician Visits After Hospital
Discharge: Implications for Reducing Readmissions, NAT’L INST. HEALTH CARE REFORM,
RES. BRIEF NO. 6, Dec. 2011, at 1 (documenting the increased recognition, including
by public and private payers, of the value of preventing readmissions to improve
health care quality and reduce unnecessary costs); Karen M. Cheung-Larivee, NQF
Endorses
Readmission
Measures,
FIERCEHEALTHCARE
(Apr.
27,
2012),
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/nqf-endorses-readmissions-measures/201204-27 (discussing federal efforts to encourage increased communication and
collaboration among all the stakeholders, including hospitals, needed to reduce
avoidable re-hospitalizations).
243. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text; infra notes 248–60 and
accompanying text (providing examples of the various methods that hospitals have
voluntarily undertaken to prevent patient readmissions after discharge).
244. Ray Freeland’s case, introduced at the beginning of this Article, provides an
example of how monitoring can protect patients and reduce costs. See supra notes
13–17 and accompanying text.
245. This communication could be an automated electronic message triggered
when a certain parameter is met, it could be a hospital nurse on the phone, or it
could be an employee of a third party contracted to oversee monitoring, to name just
a few possibilities. However, if a competent patient refuses post-discharge assistance,
this should generally constitute an intervening event that relieves the hospital of
post-discharge liability. See supra note 89. On the other hand, if the hospital is or
should be aware that the patient is incapable of understanding the nature and value
of this assistance or accepting it, the hospital should take reasonable steps to
enhance its availability.
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Nevertheless, what many hospitals are already doing, as described at
the outset of this Article246 and as follows,247 provides guidance as to
what the medical community considers both reasonable and
necessary during and following a patient’s discharge.
The Care Transitions Intervention study248 and Project ReEngineered Discharge (“Project RED”)249 are just two initiatives that
demonstrate reasonable means by which hospitals can reduce postdischarge complications and re-hospitalizations.250 For the former,
patients are provided with “a personal health record and [. . .] a
series of visits and telephone calls with a transition coach.”251 This
coach meets with the patient in the hospital before discharge to
answer questions and to arrange for a home visit, typically within
forty-eight to seventy-two hours after discharge.252 During the home
visit, the coach reconciles all of the patient’s medication regimens
and reviews each medication with the patient to ensure that he or she
understands its purpose, when and how to take it, and potential
246. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text (discussing a wireless heart
monitoring system to track the condition of discharged patients).
247. See infra notes 248–60 and accompanying text (discussing the ways hospitals
can reduce hospital readmission after a patient is discharged, such as by offering
home visits, coaches, and other forms of monitoring).
248. See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 1822 (describing the Care Transitions
Intervention study and the results following the implementation of this model, where
patients and caregivers took on “more active role[s] during care transitions” to
determine if this reduced rehospitalization rates).
249. See
Project
Red
(Re-Engineered
Discharge),
B.U.
MED.
CTR.,
http://www.bu.edu/fammed/projectred (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that
the project “develops and tests strategies to improve the hospital discharge process in a
way that promotes patient safety and reduces re-hospitalization rates”).
250. See supra notes 247–48; see also Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 1067–68
(describing other model programs); Coleman & Berenson, supra note 26, at 533
(discussing controlled studies showing that management of transitional care by
advance practice nurses can reduce rehospitalization rates); Mosquera, supra note 5
(noting that hospitals that use nurse care managers to coordinate care plans and
help steer patients toward health goals have been successful in preventing hospital
readmission). Research efforts continue to seek the optimal means for reducing
hospital readmissions, with initial findings suggesting that there will be some
between-site variation in what works best in a given setting. See Jha et al., supra note
9, at 2643–44 (“Some previous studies suggest that comprehensive discharge
planning, effective case management, remote monitoring of the patient’s condition
from his or her home, and meticulous follow-up can reduce the frequency with
which patients with congestive heart failure return to the emergency room or are
rehospitalized. However, other studies have not shown, for example, that the use of
nurse case managers or remote monitoring is helpful . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
251. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 1823. A personal health record is a
document maintained by the patient that includes “an active problem list,
medications and allergies, whether advance care directives had been completed, and
a list of red flags, or warning symptoms or signs, that corresponded to the patient’s
chronic illnesses.” Id. Transition coaches are advanced practice nurses whose
purpose is to “provide continuity across settings, and to ensure that the patient’s
needs [are] being met irrespective of the care setting.” Id.
252. Id.
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adverse effects.253 The coach also instructs the patient on how to
effectively communicate medical needs to health care providers,
reviews warning signs pertaining to the patient’s medical condition,
and advises the patient on the best responses if warning signs
emerge.254 The coach subsequently stays in touch with the patient by
telephoning three times during a twenty-eight day posthospitalization period to monitor progress.255 The re-hospitalization
rates for patients receiving these services were significantly reduced
when compared to a control group.256 In addition, even taking into
account the added cost of these services, annual health care savings
of $295,594, or roughly $780 per patient, were achieved because of
the significantly reduced rate of re-hospitalization.257
Project RED uses a somewhat similar model to assist discharged
patients, utilizing a personal discharge advocate but also a virtual
discharge advocate named Louise to coordinate a patient’s discharge
from the moment of admission.258 The primary goal of the program
is not to provide care, but to help the patient and the caregiver
communicate more effectively and to supply needed information
during and following discharge.259 The program educates the patient
throughout the hospital stay, reconciles medications prescribed by
the treatment team, and coordinates follow-up care with communitybased providers, which includes ensuring that the patient’s primary

253. Id. at 1823–24.
254. See id. at 1824 (discussing the ways coaches teach patients how to better
communicate their needs, including role playing).
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1825–26 (stating that readmission rates were measured at thirty,
ninety, and 180-day post-discharge intervals, and finding that participants in the
intervention study had lower readmission rates at each interval).
257. Id. at 1827. Note that the calculated savings was probably conservative
because the health delivery system participating in the study had already made “great
progress” in reducing readmissions, indicating a greater potential for reduction and
savings in systems that had not made similar progress. See id. (projecting that greater
reductions in readmissions would probably be seen in other health delivery systems
that had not previously attempted and achieved progress in reducing readmissions).
258. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., RESEARCH ACTIVITIES NO. 367, RE-ENGINEERED DISCHARGE PROJECT
DRAMATICALLY REDUCES RETURN TRIPS TO THE HOSPITAL 5 (2011), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mar11/0311RA.pdf (explaining in detail the
computer system, Louise, that tracks and guides patients). With a paper copy of an
After Hospital Care Plan in hand, patients spend about forty minute walking through
the plan with the aid of prompts from a touch screen computer and where they can
also ask “Louise” questions. The computer program also checks the patient’s
comprehension of key information, such as when and how to take medications. If
the patient does not understand something, the program will present the
information again and ultimately alert a human discharge assistant if this second
attempt at relaying the information is unsuccessful. Id.
259. See id. at 3–4 (emphasizing the plan’s use of plain language).
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care physician receives the discharge summary.260 Project RED
achieved a 30% decrease in readmissions thirty days post-discharge.261
This model has now been adopted by the National Quality Forum as
one of the national “Safe Practices for Better Healthcare.”262
These programs are not anomalous; as noted, other hospitals
around the country are experimenting with various ways of providing
discharge and post-discharge assistance that are generating positive
results.263 These programs have demonstrated that this type of
assistance is increasingly viewed as something that hospitals can
implement in a relatively cost-effective fashion while providing
discharged patients with an enormously valuable service.

260. See id. at 3 (presenting a Project RED checklist, which includes
communicating with primary care doctors).
261. See id. (discussing the results of a Project RED test conducted at Boston
University Medical Center).
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text (noting the use of a wireless
heart monitoring system); see, e.g., Engel et al., supra note 56, at 459 (finding that
the highest frequency of patient comprehension deficiencies occurs in conjunction
with discharge instructions and suggesting remedies for this problem); Karen
Minich-Pourshadi, Predictive Modeling Options To Cut Preventable Admissions,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA, Apr. 2012, at 48–52 (reporting that several hospitals have
successfully decreased patient readmissions after discharge by using a form of
predictive modeling based on hospital records); Sommers & Cunningham, supra
note 244, at 1 (noting that efforts to improve post-discharge plans alone have not
led to fewer readmissions and lower costs, but discussing two new hospital payment
plans that incentivize broader efforts to reduce hospital readmissions); Christina
Hernandez Sherwood, Hospitals Reach Out To Keep Patients from Returning, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 28, 2011, at A3 (describing a hospital’s success in preventing
patient readmissions by using community health workers who work with patients
on a continuing basis to ensure they receive proper treatment for their healthcare
needs); Mary Bondmass et al., The Effect of Physiologic Home Monitoring and
Telemanagement on Chronic Heart Failure Outcomes, 3 INTERNET J. ADVANCED NURSING PRAC.
(1999), available at http://www.ispub.com/journal/the-internet-journal-of-advancednursing-practice/volume-3-number-2/the-effect-of-physiologic-home-monitoring-andtelemanagement-on-chronic-heart-failure-outcomes-1.html#sthash.I5OR129r.dpbs
(describing a new strategy to reduce hospital readmissions involving
telemonitoring where medical management and intervention is provided by
telephone based on data from a transtelephonic monitoring system); Dina
Overland, BCBS Saves $232M, Cuts Readmissions with Patient Registries,
FIERCEHEALTHPAYER (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/bcbssaves-232m-lowers-readmissions-patient-registries/2012-04-21 (discussing the success of
a collaborative program where hospitals share patient data to improve care, reduce
costly complications, and identify best practices); Studies Evaluate Programs to Transition
Care of Patients After Hospital Discharge, SCI. DAILY (July 25, 2011),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110725190035.htm (noting that
hospital readmissions decreased when patients participated in a care transition
intervention program where they received a home visit and two follow-up telephone
calls, or in a transitional care program led by advance practice nurses who provided
eight post-discharge house visits).
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E. Limits on Liability
Naturally, there must be a limit to the extent of a hospital’s duty
both during and after a patient’s discharge. The practice of
medicine remains as much an art as a science,264 and tragic events can
occur even when every feasible precaution has been taken.265 Lest a
hospital be subjected to unrealistic expectations, second-guessing,
and liability for events that could not have been reasonably
anticipated nor prevented, some check on the extent of these duties
must be in place. The widely accepted and employed legal element
of foreseeability provides an important limit on hospitals’ dischargerelated duties by ensuring that they are not held liable for adverse
events not reasonably foreseeable at the time of discharge or during
post-discharge monitoring.266 Fortunately, there are now multiple
approaches hospitals can adopt that adequately meet this
responsibility without imposing an onerous burden.267
CONCLUSION
Formally recognizing the fiduciary duty of hospitals with regard to
patient discharges and post-discharge monitoring will ensure that
patients receive vital preparation for their discharge and are provided
264. See ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE
SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 4 (1980) (acknowledging that applying the scientific
knowledge associated with the practice of medicine remains an art form).
265. See Jones v. Porretta, 405 N.W.2d 863, 869 (Mich. 1987) (recognizing that
physicians are at fault only when their conduct violates the standard of care, not
simply when a patient experiences bad results); Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754,
761 (Wis. 1990) (“The medical profession is not an exact science and its members
are not subject to liability for mere unfavorable results. Physicians are not insurers or
guarantors of their work.” (citation omitted)).
266. See supra note 89 (noting that action or inaction by a discharged patient that
could not reasonably have been foreseen will generally be viewed as an intervening
cause that relieves the health care provider of liability); supra note 245 (commenting
that if a competent patient refuses post-discharge assistance, this should generally
constitute an intervening event that relieves the hospital of post-discharge liability);
see, e.g., Bornmann v. Great Sw. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 453 F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1971)
(finding a hospital not liable for the death of a patient from a self-administered
overdose of barbiturate drugs where no one, including the husband of the deceased,
had observed any indications of potential suicide); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348,
353 (Fla. 2002) (stating that the elements for breach of fiduciary duty require “the
existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that it is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s damages”). But see supra notes 89 and 245 (stating that
foreseeable non-cooperation or a recognized lack of patient capacity to understand
the nature and value of this assistance or capacity to accept it, may result in an
imposition of hospital liability); see, e.g., Riddle Mem’l Hosp. v. Dohan, 475 A.2d
1314, 1317 (Pa. 1984) (reasoning that if the hospital acted unreasonably in
discharging a patient, and it was “foreseeable that such removal would aggravate or
increase the danger of the existing physical condition [of the patient], the hospital
would be liable”).
267. See supra notes 13–18, 248–60 and accompanying text.
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needed follow-up assistance for a period of time commensurate with
their continuing health risks or until another health care provider
has assumed responsibility for the patient. Current applications of
legal doctrines associated with traditional medical malpractice and
hospital liability claims do not adequately redress or deter the
preventable adverse events that can occur after a patient leaves a
hospital or a similar health care facility, but recognition and
enforcement of the hospital-patient fiduciary duty can mitigate this
problem by ensuring that hospitals take reasonable steps to aid
patients both during and after discharge. Patients who are injured as
a result of inadequate discharge and follow-up services should be
compensated for harm that is a foreseeable consequence of a failure
to provide these services.
As physicians recognized long ago, proper health care cannot exist
without mutual trust and respect between the parties. If hospitals are
to effectively fill their modern role as the nexus of health care
delivery, patients must be able to safely trust hospitals to guard their
interests in the same manner they trust their doctor.

